Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and \u27Irrevocable\u27 Thirteenth Amendment by Bryant, A. Christopher
University of Cincinnati College of Law
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications
Faculty Articles and Other Publications College of Law Faculty Scholarship
2003
Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and 'Irrevocable'
Thirteenth Amendment
A. Christopher Bryant
University of Cincinnati College of Law, chris.bryant@UC.Edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal History, Theory and Process Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship
and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of
Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bryant, A. Christopher, "Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and 'Irrevocable' Thirteenth Amendment" (2003). Faculty Articles and Other
Publications. Paper 63.
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/63
HeinOnline -- 26 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 501 2003
STOPPING TIME: THE PRO-SLA VERY AND 
"IRREVOCABLE" THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
• A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT 
I. EXTRALEGAL AUTHORITY AND THE 
CREATION OF ARTICLE V ...................................... 505 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CORWIN 
AMENDMENT .......................................................... 512 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CORWIN 
AMENDMENT ......................................................... 520 
A. Debate in the House of Representatives ................ .521 
B. Debate in the Senate .............................................. .523 
1. Political Positions on the 
Corwin Resolution ........................................ 524 
2. Constitutional Challenge to the Corwin 
Resolution ...................................................... 530 
IV. EFFICACY OF THE CORWIN AMENDMENT ........... 534 
V. CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
CORWIN AMENDMENT ......................................... 540 
A. Conflicting Understandings of Article v .............. .541 
B. Applying the Lessons Learned from the 
Corwin Amendment ............................................... 545 
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 548 
In the post-secession winter of 1861, both Houses of Congress 
• Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. I thank Steven A. Bank, Tom W. Bell, Jay S. Bybee, Gabirel J. Chin, David P. 
Currie, G.M. Curtis, Richard A. Epstein, Charles L. Flynn, Jr., Morgan Frankel, Grant M. 
Hayden, Lynne N. Henderson, Steven F. Huether, Steve R. Johnson, David Katz, Michael 
1. Krauss, David E. Kyvig, Margo M. Lambert, Saul Levmore, Neil Lloyd, Thomas B. 
McAffee, Alison Moore, Andrew P. Morriss, Erin A. O'Hara, Timothy J. Simeone, Erika 
Singer, and Carl Tobias for their insightful comments on prior drafts. Prior versions of this 
article were also presented and critiqued at the 1998 annual meeting of the American 
Society for Legal History and faculty workshops held at the Boyd School of Law, George 
Mason University School of Law, and Oklahoma City University School of Law. I thank 
the participants in those discussions for their many helpful comments as well. In addition, 
I am grateful to Amber Craig, Jason Fowler, Michael Saunders, and Andrew Spalding for 
excellent research assistance, and the James E. Rogers Research Grant Foundation for 
financial support. Remaining errors are, of course, mine alone. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 502 2003
502 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 26 
approved a proposed thirteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
Three northern States even managed to ratify the proposal before the 
Civil War intervened. That version of the thirteenth amendment, 
introduced in the House by Representative Thomas Corwin of Ohio, 
purported to prohibit any future amendment granting Congress power 
to interfere with slavery in the States. The Congressional Globe 
volumes for the winter 1861 legislative session include rich debates 
about whether the amending power could be used to limit future 
exercise of that same authority. Those forgotten debates offer 
significant insights for modem controversies about the exclusivity of, 
and limitations on, the extraordinary power granted in Article V of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Not long ago the consensus among constitutional scholars was that, 
for better or worse, Article V of the U.S. Constitution was a dead 
letter.' But reports of Article V's demise have been greatly 
exaggerated, and the amending provision has more recently enjoyed 
something of a resurrection, both in Congress and among legal 
academics. 2 In the last decade Article V has served as an outlet for 
widespread discontent with Supreme Court decisions protecting flag-
burning, prohibiting prayer in public schools, and voiding 
congressional term limits. These are only the most recurrent and high-
profile examples of a growing political trend toward employing 
constitutional amendment as a means to address divisive and vexing 
national issues. Indeed, the proliferation of proposed constitutional 
amendments introduced in Congress has raised questions about 
whether they reflect a dangerous disrespect for our existing 
. . I d 3 conshtuhona or er. 
I. As Philip Kurland put it in a 1966 essay on the amending provision, given that the 
U.S. Supreme Court effectively "exercised a veto power over the actions of the state 
legislatures, executives, and judiciaries" under a broad reading of the Civil War 
Amendments, and had for even longer asserted a similar prerogative with respect to the 
coordinate branches of the federal government, the Article V amendment process had as a 
consequence been rendered "all but superfluous." Philip B. Kurland, Article V and the 
Amending Process, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 130, 132 (Daniel 1. Boorstin ed., 1966). 
2. To be sure, notwithstanding renewed congressional and academic interest in Article 
V, some scholars still adhere to Professor Kurland's assessment (see supra note \) of that 
provision's significance. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional 
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1505 (2001) (asserting that "our constitutional 
order would look little different if a formal amendment process did not exist"); but see 
Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A 
Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247 (2002). 
3. See, e.g., John Coq,yers, Jr., Is the United States Constitution a "Rough Draft"? An 
Open Letter to the 105 Congress, 6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 323 (1997); Constitutional 
Pol/ution ... , WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1998, at A18; David E. Kyvig, Arranging for 
Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of Constitutional Design, in UNINTENDED 
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No doubt these recent invocations of Article V are in part 
responsible for the recent outpouring of academic writing on the 
amending power. Salient examples of this scholarship are the works 
of Yale Law School Professors Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar, 
who have raised distinct challenges to the claim that Article V 
constitutes the sole legitimate means for constitutional revision.
4 
Their imaginative and controversial work has in tum prompted 
vigorous debate among constitutional scholars, political scientists, 
and historians about the role Article V can and should play III our 
constitutional order. 5 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 9 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000). 
Though none of these most recent proposals for a constitutional amendment has won the 
super-majorities needed to escape Congress, the 1992 ratification of the Twenty-seventh 
Amendment has apparently changed our shared constitutional text, notwithstanding 
significant constitutional questions about the elapse of time between its proposal and 
adoption. Not surprisingly, this amendment's unique history has produced a rich academic 
literature concerning the amending power. See. e.g., Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper 
Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 
497 (1992); Stewart Dalzell & Eric 1. Beste, Is the Twenty-seventh Amendment 200 Years 
Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501 (1994); Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, 
Necromancing the Equal Rights Amendment, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 593 (2000); Sanford 
Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-seventh Amendment, 
II CONST. COMMENT. 101 (1994); JoAnne D. Spotts, Note, The Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment: A Late Bloomer or a Dead Horse?, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 337 (1994); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the 
Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993); William Van Alstyne, What Do 
You Think About the Twenty-seventh Amendment?, 10 CON ST. COMMENT. 9 (1993). 
4. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; AKHIL REED 
AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS 
ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 5-6 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: 
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter 
Amar, Consent of the Governed]; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the 
Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited]; Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional 
Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 89 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Amar, 
Popular Sovereignty]. 
5. See, e.g., DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION xi (1996) (explaining that the book's thesis developed in part in response 
to Professor Ackerman's work); Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of 
Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155, 186-93 (1997) (critiquing positions 
espoused by Ackerman and Amar); Carlos E. Gonzalez, Popular Sovereign Generated 
Versus Government Institlltion Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a 
Constitutional Amendment Not Amend the Constitlltion?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 127, 234 
(2002) (advancing a "dual-source thesis" concerning the relative force of different 
constitutional amendments, which "neatly complements the current literature on Article 
V;" expressly referencing the works of Ackerman and Amar) ; John Harrison, The 
Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001) 
(responding to Professor Ackerman's challenge to defend the ratification of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments as consistent with the requirements of Article V); Brett W. 
King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context. Popular Sovereignty. and 
Slipermajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609, 615-16 (2000) (criticizing Amar's 
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As voluminous as the recent Article V scholarship has been, at least 
one fundamental question has gone virtually unnoticed: what, if 
anything, prevents or limits the use of Article V to make procedural 
or substantive changes to the amending power itself? This question 
presents problems of the greatest theoretical difficulty. One might be 
tempted to dismiss the question as merely academic or historical, but 
a constitutional amendment proposed in the 106th Congress would 
have authorized two-thirds of the State legislatures to propose future 
amendments, which would, in tum, be referred back to the States for 
ratification unless two-thirds of both Houses of Congress voted to kill 
the proposals.6 The question whether the amending power could be 
employed to amend the amending power was posed even more starkly 
by Mr. Corwin's 1861 proposal. 
This article uses that Civil War-era proposal as a lens through 
which to study the tension between the claim that Article V articulates 
the exclusive procedure by which the Constitution may be amended 
and our nation's historical commitment to the ideal that the people are 
sovereign. Revisiting the long-forgotten Corwin Amendment 
illuminates current debates about the legal and political theory by 
which the U.S. Constitution can set forth the sole means for its 
revision. By understanding why the Corwin Amendment would have 
failed in its stated purpose (because a subsequent Article V 
amendment would have been sufficient to repeal it and grant 
Congress power over slavery), we discover certain fundamental 
constitutional principles. Those principles, important in their own 
interpretation of Article V); Kris w. Kobach, May "We the People" Speak?: The 
Forgotten Role of Constituent Instructions in Amending the Constitution, 33 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. I, 91 n.402 (1999) (relying on Professor Ackerman's analysis of the 
Reconstruction-Era Amendments); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our 
Supermajorilarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 726, 794 (2002) (responding to 
theses of Amar and Ackerman); Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s}, Original 
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996) 
(challenging Professor Amar's conclusions about the amending power). See also Vikram 
David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and 
Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1042-53 (2000) (detailed analysis of the text and history of 
Article V); Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An 
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. III 
(1993) (developing an economic theory of the Article V amendment process); infra notes 
230-70 and accompanying text (applying lessons of the Corwin Amendment to debates in 
contemporary legal literature). 
6. H.R.1. Res. 29, 106th Congo (1999). See Guy Gugliotta, A Noble Attempt to Amend 
the Constitution, THE WASH.POST, July I, 1997, at AI7 (discussing prior version of 
proposed amendment); see also infra note 226. Whether a constitutional amendment may 
prohibit future amendments is also a subject of present controversy in Cuba. See Mary 
Jordan, Castro Takes a Page From Foes' Playbook: Cuban Leader Counters Dissidents 
With Petition, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at A IS. 
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right, also raise novel questions concerning the contemporary claims 
of Professors Ackerman and Amar that Article V cannot be the 
exclusive procedure for legitimate constitutional change. 
The first part of this article examines Article V's background, 
uncovering the founding generation's understanding of the 
relationship between popular sovereignty and the people's ability to 
amend or supplant an existing constitution. Part II places the Corwin 
Amendment in its historical context, which is essential to an 
appreciation of the legislative debates concerning the proposal. Part 
III explores those debates, gleaning insights from the amendment's 
advocates and opponents. Part IV argues that the Corwin Amendment 
could have been repealed by a subsequent amendment, like any other 
constitutional provision not expressly excluded from Article V's 
compass by the Article itself. The final part of this article discusses 
the contemporary significance of this historical conclusion for recent 
assertions by prominent scholars that Article V should be seen as but 
one among many ways to amend the Constitution. 
I. EXTRALEGAL AUTHORITY AND THE CREATION OF ARTICLE V 
In his 1796 Farewell Address, George Washington observed that 
"[t]he basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make 
and to alter their constitutions of government.,,7 His reflection touches 
upon three ideas essential to an understanding of American 
constitutionalism in general and the Article V amending power in 
particular. 
First, the revolutionary and founding-era generations of Americans 
were fiercely committed to the idea of "popular sovereignty," that the 
people themselves were sovereign and the powers of government 
derived from their consent. 8 Second, "the right . . . to make and to 
alter" forms of government reflected the founding era's assumption of 
a right of revolution, which achieved perhaps its most refined 
expression in the Declaration of Independence and its most 
memorable manifestation in the War for Independence. Finally, long 
before 1787, Americans had taken the extraordinary step of 
enshrining in written constitutions the means for their amendment at 
7. George Washington, Farewell Address, (1796), reprinted in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 
192,199 (Daniell. Boorstin ed., 1966). 
8. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF 
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988). 
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both the state and federal levels.
9 
In so doing, it has been arguedo' 
"Americans had in fact institutionalized and legitimized revolution.,,1 
Indeed, the first constitution of the United States, the Articles of 
Confederation, has been characterized as "a constitutional expression 
of the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence.,,11 One place 
where the relationship between these two documents is most evident 
is in Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation, which declared 
both that "the Union shall be perpetual," and that the Articles could 
be altered by "agree[ment] [] in a Congress of the United States, and 
[] afterwards confirm[ation] by the Legislature of every State." This 
amending provision-part of the original, so-called Dickinson draft of 
the Articles-provoked relatively little controversy when the Articles 
were drafted and adopted. 12 But it proved the cause of our first federal 
constitution's relatively brief tenure. As dissatisfaction with the 
efficacy of the Articles government mounted, and proposals for 
change fell victim to the unanimity requirement for state ratification, 
"the Confederation rapidly came to be seen as not only unsatisfactory 
in practice but also impossibly difficult to reform.,,13 
Throughout the first five years of life under the Articles, numerous 
proposed amendments foundered upon the shoals of Article XIII's 
unanimity requirement, culminating in the fall 1786 recommendation 
by the woefully incomplete Annapolis convention that a new 
constitutional convention be held in Philadelphia the following 
9. See JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 25 (1992). As Professor Kyvig has observed: 
Unwilling to accept the notion that the terms of government were unchangeable 
except by revolution yet indisposed to treat the fundamental directives to and 
limitations on government as ordinary law susceptible to reform by simple 
parliamentary majority, some states began working out arrangements by which 
their new constitutions could be changed .... Although methods varied, most 
states sought to ensure that amendment could be achieved only when a broad 
consensus, a supermajority of the sovereign people or their representatives, 
agreed to a change. 
KYVIG, supra note 5, at 30. 
10. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 614 (W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1993) (1969). See also VILE, supra note 9, at 27, 31. In the words of Dr. 
Jarvis, uttered in debate during the Massachusetts ratifYing convention: "In other 
countries, sir, -unhappily for mankind, -the history of their respective revolutions has 
been written in blood; ... When we shall have adopted the Constitution before us, we shall 
have in this article an adequate provision for all the purposes of political reformation." 2 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 116 (Ayer Co. 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836). 
II. MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF 
THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 239 (I 940). 
12. See id. at 138-39. 
13. KYVIG, supra note 5, at 37. 
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spring.
14 
As the antifederalists would delight in pointing out during 
the state ratifying conventions, the resolution of the Confederation 
Congress authorizing the Philadelphia convention both incorporated 
by reference the Article XIII amendment procedures and purported to 
limit the convention's authority to 
the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of 
Confederation and reporting to Congress . and the several 
legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when 
agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the 
federal constitution adequate \0 the exigencies of Government & 
the preservation of the Union. 1 
Nevertheless, a majority of the delegates to the Philadelphia 
convention would eventually conclude that the power to amend the 
Articles of Confederation necessarily included the power to replace 
them altogether and, further, that ratification by conventions in nine 
states would be sufficient to establish a new constitution among 
16 
them. 
This self-conscious departure from both the convention's 
authorizing resolution and the procedures for amendment under 
Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation was "arguably the most 
revolutionary act of the Philadelphia convention.,,17 The Philadelphia 
convention rested its authority on neither its authorizing resolution 
nor on the procedures for amendment set forth in the Articles but 
rather relied upon, in the words of James Wilson of Pennsylvania, 
"the original powers of Society.,,18 As Wilson explained, "[t]he House 
on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard to ordinary 
rights.,,19 Professor Richard Kay has observed that the "illegality [of 
the Constitution of 1787] is indeed a paradox and not a contradiction. 
14. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
DURING THE CONFEDERATION 399-421 (1950). 
15. 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 13-14 
(3d. ed. 1966). 
16. See U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
17. KYVIG, supra note 5, at 42. 
18. 2 Max FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 469 
(3d. ed. 1966). 
19. [d. For opposing views on the "legality" of the Constitution, compare Amar, 
Popular Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 92-103, with ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra 
note 4, at 41-42. Notably even Professor Amar, who forcefully rejects the claim that the 
Philadelphia convention acted "illegally," characterizes Article VII of the Constitution as 
"undeniably inconsistent" with Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation. Amar, 
Popular Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 93. See also Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the 
Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57 (1987) (concluding that the Constitution of 1787 
"was itself the product of a blatant and conscious illegality"). 
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For it is exactly its break with prior legality that invested the 
Constitution with the power it still exercises over us .... ,,20 
In other words, the power of the Philadelphia convention to 
propose the new constitution (and that of nine state ratifying 
conventions to ratify it) stemmed not from the positive-law grant of 
authority reflected in the thirteenth Article of the Articles of 
Confederation, but rather directlit from the natural rights of revolution 
and political self-determination. I Like the Stamp Act and Continental 
Congresses that had come before it, the Philadelphia convention was 
an extralegal body, in that it operated outside the boundaries 
established by the existing fundamentallaw.
22 
The convention's work 
product would be judged not by its procedural adherence to 
established forms but rather according to whether it succeeded in its 
attempt to exercise an "unalienable Right[]" of "all Men"-
specifically, the "Right of the People to alter or abolish" an existing 
government and "institute" a new one more "likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness.,,23 The framers ultimately relied on the people, 
acting in state ratifying conventionsi to invest the proposed Constitution with this popular authority. 4 Moreover, as the framers' 
very basis for invoking this "Right" was that it had not been, because 
it could not be, surrendered, the Constitution, like the Articles of 
Confederation before it, remains perpetually subject to an appeal to 
this ultimate source of political and legal authority.25 
Following the example of the Articles of Confederation and many 
20. Kay, supra note 19, at 57-58; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: 
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 130 (1996) ("[T]he resort to 
popular sovereignty in 1787-88 marked the point where the distinction between a 
constitution and ordinary law became the fundamental doctrine of American political 
thinking. Far from being less legal than the other charters that had gone before it, the 
Constitution established a more profound criterion oflegality itself."). 
21. See RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 105 (noting that the framers justified their failure to 
comply with the Articles of Confederation amendment procedures by invoking principles 
of popular sovereignty).; Kay, supra note 19, at 71 (noting that the "principle upon which 
the advocates of the Constitution relied was, above all, the sovereignty of the people"). 
22. See WOOD, supra note 10, at 102, 314-19, 354. 
23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
24. See RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 105-06 (arguing that the framers chose to submit the 
Constitution to state conventions rather than state legislatures for ratification largely 
because the former would more clearly be endowed with the authority provided by resort 
to "revolution principles"). 
25. Cf RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 107 (,,[T]he precedent set at Philadelphia proved that 
deference to prescribed forms need not prevail during an appeal to "first principles."); 
Kay, supra note 19, at 75,80 (observing that "legitimacy turns on the acceptability of the 
substance and origins of a pre-constitutional rule to participants in the legal system" and 
that "that acceptability is always a current acceptability"; "[i]n this respect we are always 
in a situation like the one that confronted the founders in 1787-89"). 
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of the state constitutions of the founding era, the Constitution likewise 
included express procedures for its own revision. Introduced at the 
outset of the Philadelphia convention, the Virginia plan proposed that 
"provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of 
Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the 
National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.,,26 The 
suggestion that congressional assent ought to be unnecessary for an 
amendment sparked controversy when first debated by the full 
convention, and resolution of the question was postponed.27 Other 
matters occupied the delegates' attention until September 10, 1787, 
when they debated the Committee on Detail's succinct proposal that, 
"[ o]n the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in 
the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of 
the U.S. shall call a Convention for the purpose.,,28 Alexander 
Hamilton then argued that the national legislature ought also to be 
empowered to propose amendments, as "[t]he State Legislatures will 
not applr. for alterations but with a view to increase their own 
powers." 9 On the other hand, he insisted, "The National Legislature 
will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity 
of amendments, and ought also to be empowered, whenever two 
thirds of each branch should concur to call a Convention.,,30 After the 
delegates voted in favor of a three-fourths threshold for ratification by 
the states, Madison proposed language that more closely anticipated 
31 
the final product. 
With an acceptable framework largely in place, the Convention 
then turned to proposed limits on the scope of the amending power. 
John Rutledge of South Carolina insisted that "he never could agree 
to give a power by which the articles relating to slaves might be 
altered by the States not interested in that property and prejudiced 
against it.,,32 Thus, a proviso that those clauses of Article I relating to 
26. I MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22 
(3d. ed. 1966). See generally KYVIG, supra note 5, at 55-63 (discussing the framing of 
Article V of the U.S. Constitution); RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 91 (same). 
27. I FARRAND, supra note 26, at 202-03. 
28. 2 FARRAND, supra note 18, at 557; see also RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION By NATIONAL 
CONVENTION (1988) (providing a systematic examination of the history and operation of 
the national convention clause of Article V); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 733-60 (addressing 
riddles raised by the national convention clause of Article V). 
29. 2 FARRAND, supra note 18, at 558. 
30. ld. 
31. ld. at 559. 
32. ld. 
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the slave trade could not be amended prior to 1808 was added to 
Madison's proposal, which then won the Convention's approval.33 
The debate had yet to conclude, however, for five days later Roger 
Sherman of Connecticut, fearful "that three fourths of the States 
might be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing 
them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Senate," 
advocated an extension of "the proviso in favor of the States 
importing slaves ... so as to provide that no State should be affected 
in its internal police, or deprived of its eguality in the Senate .... ,,34 
After Sherman's proposal was defeated,35 Gouverneur Morris moved 
"to annex [to Article V] a further proviso-'that no State, without its 
consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. ",36 
According to Madison's notes, that "motion being dictated by the 
circulating murmurs of the small States was agreed to without debate, 
no one opposing it, or on the question, saying no.,,37 Thus, the final 
text of the Constitution's amending article emerged from the 
convention as follows: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on 
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, 
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of 
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths 
of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as 
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior 
to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any 
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of 
the first Article; and that no State, witho~t its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 8 
The decision to include in the Constitution a procedure for its own 
revision figured prominently not only in the Philadelphia convention 
but also in the ensuing state ratification debates. Indeed, the historical 
record strongly suggests that some procedure for amendment was 
necessary for ratification of the Constitution. The inclusion of Article 
V provided the proponents of ratification with a powerful rhetorical 
33. [d. 
34. [d. at 629. 
35. [d. at 630. 
36. [d. at 631. 
37. [d. 
38. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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tool, anning them with the response of last resort that any defects in 
the Constitution could be swiftly remedied after ratification.39 The 
state ratifying conventions in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New 
York, Virginia, and South Carolina all proposed extensive revisions 
for the consideration of the First Congress.40 And of course this 
powerful political impetus for amendment of the new Constitution 
was reflected in the swift adoption of the Bill of Rights. As Elbridge 
Gerry of Massachusetts put the matter during debate in the First 
Congress, Article V was to the founding generation "the most 
important clause in the Constitution [], and one without which, I will 
be bold to say, this system of Government would have never been 
ratified. ,,41 
Like the Philadelphia convention's replacement of the Articles of 
Confederation unanimity requirement with the less onerous Article 
VII procedures for ratification, the Article V procedures for future 
amendment, including the substantive limitations on the scope of the 
amending power, reflected the delegates' understanding of their role 
as extralegal. Like the power to depart from the Articles of 
Confederation procedures for amendment, the power to prescribe 
positive-law procedures for future constitutional change was 
implicitly rooted in an appeal to "the original powers of Society," to 
use the words of James Wilson. The prevailing ideology also 
compelled the conclusion that this awesome and revolutionary 
authority of the sovereign could not be alienated. Thus the new 
Constitution, like the Articles of Confederation whose place it 
usurped, would forever be subject to an analogous appeal to that 
1 . h . 42 U hmate aut onty. 
Article V, however, provided a more regularized and stable method 
of constitutional evolution than resort to the mysterious and extralegal 
authority invoked by the Declaration of Independence and the 
39. See KYVIG, supra note 5, at 66. 
40. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS 14-28 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). 
41. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 523 (1789). 
42. Cf RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 107; Kay, supra note 19, at 75, 80. To be sure, 
Madison recoiled from Jefferson's radical proposal that every constitution and every law 
naturally expire with the passage of nineteen years. See Denning, supra note 5, at 172-74 
(discussing famous Jefferson-Madison correspondence on the subject). But Madison never 
repudiated his many prior assertions that popular sovereignty was the ultimate source of all 
legitimate political authority. See KYVIG, supra note 5, at 128-30. Rather, more mindful of 
practical considerations and the need for social stability, Madison merely adhered to the 
received notion that popular consent could be tacit as well as express. See Denning, supra 
note 5, at 174. 
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founders of the Constitution. Thus, future generations of U.S. citizens 
would be presented with what could be tenned an election of 
constitutional remedies. A decision to forsake the extralegal power 
invoked in the American revolution and Philadelphia convention, and 
instead rely on the authority provided by compliance with the positive 
commands of Article V, would not only offer the shelter of nonnality 
but also subject the effort to the limits, both explicit and implicit, 
imposed by the founders on the Article V amending power. With a 
view to the conundrum presented by the Corwin Resolution, future 
generations could use Article V to make an unamendable amendment 
only if the founders granted this power to future generations. It is to 
that question I will return after a discussion of the debates in Congress 
over the Corwin Resolution. 
But before jumping ahead to the secessionist winter of 1861, one 
more telling exchange from the founding era bears notice. That the 
founders of the Constitution understood themselves to be exercising 
extraordinary power, which enabled them to set the positive-law 
amendment procedures for future generations, is powerfully 
evidenced by James Madison's comments during the First Congress. 
Answering the application of the Virginia ratifying convention 
requesting that the First Congress, much like the Articles Congress 
that had preceded it, call a convention to propose amendments to the 
new Constitution, Madison argued that under Article V, "Congress 
had no deliberative power with respect to a convention; for whenever 
two thirds of the states should apply, they were bound to call one; but 
till this concurrent application took ;lace, they had no power 
whatever to enter into the subject .... ,,4 Thus, Madison denied to his 
fellow Virginians the very power he as the "father of the 
Constitution" had relied upon not two years before. In so doing, he 
implicitly distinguished between constitutional amendment under 
Article V, which required strict adherence to fonn, and the appeal to 
"original powers of Society" that had justified creation of the 
Constitution itself. 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 
Before the Thirteenth Amendment of 1865, the United States 
nearly adopted a very different thirteenth amendment in 1861. The 
story of that thirteenth amendment begins on December 3, 1860, 
43. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 58. 
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when a lame-duck session of Congress assembled in the Capitol to 
address a pressing sectional and constitutional crisis. Throughout the 
prior eleven months, southern political leaders had made it clear that 
the election of Abraham Lincoln would be anathema, and 
immediately following his narrow victory the deep South acted 
swiftly on its threats. By February 1861, seven "gulf' states had 
seceded from the Union and formed the Confederate States of 
America.
44 
Eight southern, slave-holding states remained in the 
balance, waiting on the resolution of compromise efforts before 
deciding whether to stay with the Union or go with the Confederacy. 
Entrenched in Springfield until his March 4 inauguration, Lincoln 
refused to offer the South a conciliatory gesture, declaring that any 
statement intended to reassure the South "would make me appear as if 
I repented for the crime of having been elected, and was anxious to 
apologize and beg forgiveness.,,45 Any hope for compromise therefore 
depended on congressional leadership. 
Of course Congress had a history of narrowly averting crises over 
sectional disputes. But in 1861 a new generation of congressional 
leaders struggled to replace the great statesmen-such as John C. 
Calhoun, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster-who had been largely 
responsible for earlier compromises.46 Moreover, past compromises 
had resolved problems that Congress had initiated.
47 
The crisis of 
1860 was bigger than Congress, however. In the Election of 1860, 
voters in the North had pressed the South on the issue of slavery in 
the territories 48 and challenged the South to live up to its threat of 
44. See DAVID M. POTIER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861, at 442, 498-99 (1976) 
[hereinafter POTIER, IMPENDING CRISIS]; David M. POTIER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN 
THE SECESSION CRISIS 20-74 (1942) [hereinafter POTIER, LINCOLN AND H IS PARTY]. 
45. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 151-52 (Roy P. Basler ed., 
1953) [hereinafter 4 WORKS OF LINCOLN]' 
46. See POTIER, IMPENDING CRlSIS, supra note 44, at 101-02 & 119-20 (discussing 
roles Calhoun, Clay, and Webster had played in the Compromise of 1850). 
47. Congress had created past crises by considering controversial legislative proposals. 
For example, the crisis of 1820 grew out of a House bill that would have admitted 
Missouri to the Union on the condition that it gradually abolish slavery. Similarly, the 
crisis of 1850 was, at least in part, the product of the Wilmot proviso, which would have 
prohibited slavery in any territory acquired from the War with Mexico. See ALFRED H. 
KELLY, WINFRED A HARBISON, & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 262-67 (6th ed. 1983); WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS 
OF THE REpUBLICAN PARTY 69-102 (1987); GLYNDON VAN DEUSEN, WILLIAM HENRY 
SEWARD 238-54 (1967); POTIER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 522 (noting that, 
prior to 1860, congressional resolution of such crises "had been largely a matter of internal 
management."). 
48. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTI CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 544 (1978); POTIER, IMPENDING CRISIS, sllpra note 44, at 
522; POTTER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY, sllpra note 44, at 1-19. 
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secession. 
It was in this context that, during the Winter of 1861, the Second 
(lame-duck) Session of the Thirty-sixth Congress considered a 
number of compromise measures. In the tradition of his predecessor 
Henry Clay, another Kentucky Whig, Senator John J. Crittenden 
presented an Omnibus package of constitutional amendments, offered 
in an attempt to placate the South.49 The first and most controversial 
of Crittenden's seven proposed amendments would have reinstated 
the Missouri Compromise with a vengeance. It provided that all U.S. 
territory then held or thereafter acquired would be free if north of 
latitude 36" 30' and slave if south of that line. Thus, it extended the 
Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific and positively guaranteed 
slavery south of that dividing line. This proposal repudiated the 
Republican party's platform, which declared that Congress had 
plenary power over slavery in the territories and should use that 
power to forbid the expansion of slavery. 50 Accordingly, some 
Republicans argued that Crittenden's proposed amendments asked the 
Republican party to renounce its victory on this issue in the Election 
of 1860.51 
Crittenden's other proposed amendments would have protected 
slavery in the District of Columbia, prevented Congress from 
prohibiting interstate transportation of slaves, and directed Congress 
to provide compensation to slave owners who were unable to recover 
fugitive slaves because of abolitionist "violence or intimidation." The 
Crittenden Resolutions also provided that these amendments could 
not later be repealed or amended. The focus of much effort, the 
Crittenden Resolutions never received the necessary two-thirds in 
either House. 
While the Crittenden Resolutions have appropriately been the 
subject of extensive scholarly commentary, legal historians have 
largely ignorei2 the history of another proposed amendment that 
49. The Crittenden Resolutions were reprinted at CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 
1368 (1861). 
50. Reinstating the 36" 30' line also defied the holding of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), in which the Supreme Court struck down the Missouri 
Compromise. For further discussion of Dred Scoll and its aftermath, see infra notes 63-94 
and accompanying text. 
51. See POTIER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 523, 526-27. 
52. Two exceptions are Raymond Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's 
Thesis On the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 128-130 (1989) 
(discussing briefly the Corwin Resolution as indicative of the Constitution's moral flaws); 
Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional 
Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 251, 276-278 (1996) (touching on the 
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actually passed both Houses with the necessary two-thirds and was 
ratified by three states.53 That proposal (hereinafter referred to as the 
Corwin Resolution or Amendmentt provided that: "No amendment 
shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to 
Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the 
domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor 
or service by the laws of said State. ,,55 Historically, the Corwin 
Resolution provides insight into the nature of the political debate that 
divided the country in 1860.56 It also sheds light on the motives of the 
framers of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
The Corwin Resolution is also of enduring legal significance 
because it was an unprecedented attempt to use Article V of the 
Constitution to shelter forever a subject from subsequent Article V 
amendments. Debate on the Corwin Resolution, especially in the 
Senate, focused on whether one set of Article V actors could bind the 
hands of a future set of Article V actors. Members of Congress 
presented competing views regarding the efficacy of the proposed 
amendment. Their comments raised fundamental questions about how 
the U.S. Constitution, or any constitution, sustains its legitimacy. 
To understand the historical and constitutional significance of the 
Corwin Resolution, one must recall that Congress' power over slavery 
in the territories dominated political debate in the decade before the 
Civil War.57 In 1850, Congress narrowly avoided secession and war 
with an Omnibus Compromise,58 which proved to be nothing more 
historical context and theoretical issues raised by the Corwin Resolution). 
53. Recently two political scientists have written insightfully about issues raised by the 
Corwin Resolution's claim to permanency. See WILLIAM F. HARRlS, THE INTERPRETABLE 
CONSTITUTION 188-91 (1993); Mark E. Brandon, The "Original" Thirteenth Amendment 
and the Limits to Formal Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 215 (Sanford Levinson ed., 
1995). These works are discussed infra in notes 217 & 224 and accompanying text. 
54. Although Senator Seward was the first to draft and propose a version of the 
Resolution, Representative Corwin, head of the special House committee on sectional 
compromise, was responsible for the language of the final version and for shepherding the 
Resolution through the House. See HENRY H. SIMMS, A DECADE OF SECTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY: 1851-1861, at 226 n.l9 (1942); POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 
44, at 550; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 47, at 237-45. 
55. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Congo 2d Sess. 1364 (1861). 
56. See Harold M. Hyman, The Narrow Escape from a "Compromise of 1860"; 
Secession and the Constitution, in FREEDOM AND REFORM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HENRY 
STEELE COMMAGER 156 (Harold M. Hyman and Leonard W. Levy, eds., 1967). 
57. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY 
OF THE REpUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970); SIMMS, supra note 54, at 
46. 
58. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 48, at 157-77. 
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than a temporary settlement between the sections.59 The issue of 
Congress' power over slavery in the territories resurfaced in 1854.60 
When the Kansas-Nebraska Act extended the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty north of the Missouri Compromise line, the issue 
recaptured the country's energy and imagination in 1856, and 
violence erupted in "bleeding Kansas.,,61 At the same time, the 
frequency and intensity of by-then-familiar pleas for judicial 
resolution of that issue increased.62 The Supreme Court answered 
those requests with its decision in Dred Scott v. Sanjord.63 
In Dred Scott the Court reached out to resolve the issue of 
Congress' power over slavery in the territories in an attempt to 
remove it from politics.64 A black slave,65 Dred Scott, sued for his 
freedom in federal court, asserting jurisdiction based on diversity of 
citizenship.66 Scott alleged that he was a Missouri citizen and that a 
New York citizen, the defendant, wrongfully claimed to own him.67 
After the Circuit Court heard the case and returned a verdict against 
Scott, he took his case to the Supreme Court on a writ of error.68 
Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court69 concluded that Scott 
59. One historian has labeled the so-called Compromise of 1850 a mere "armistice" 
instead of a true compromise. See POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 90. 
60. See Albert L. Brophy, Note, Let us Go Back and Stand Upon the Constitution: 
Federal-State Relations in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 194 (1990) 
(providing an account of the legal history of American slavery). 
61. On this dramatic series of events in the 1850s, see POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, 
supra note 44, at 199-225. See also KELLY, HARBISON & BELZ, supra note 47, at 273-77. 
62. In his 1857 inaugural address, President Buchanan called on the country to 
"cheerfully submit" to the Court's impending decision regarding Congress' power over 
slavery in the territories. After all, the issue was "a judicial question, which legitimately 
[belonged] to the Supreme Court of the United States." Buchanan intimated that the Court 
was ready to hand down an opinion that would "speedily and finally" settle the matter. See 
KELLY, HARBISON & BELZ, supra note 47, at 278 (quoting President Buchanan's 
inaugural address). 
63. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For an excellent, brief overview and analysis of the 
decision, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 263-73 (1985). 
64. See Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case. Slavery. and the Politics of Law, 20 
HAMLINE L. REV. 1,33-34 (1996) (discussing Chief Justice Taney's political strategy and 
its impact). Admittedly, the Supreme Court was under extreme pressure to do so. See 
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 48, at 208. 
65. See Finkelman, supra note 64, at 6 (Scott's biography). 
66. For an explanation of the unusual circumstances which allowed Scott to establish 
diversity jurisdiction, see Stuart A. Streichler, Justice Curtis's Dissent in the Dred Scott 
Case: An Interpretive Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 512 (1997); Finkelman, 
supra note 64, at 18. 
67. Scott, 60 U.S. at 400. 
68. Id. 
69. That is, the Chief Justice's opinion purported to speak for the Court. Each Justice 
wrote a separate opinion, however, and four Justices of the seven-member majority 
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could not sue for two independent reasons: he was black,70 and he was 
a slave.7l To get to the latter conclusion, Taner held that Congress 
had only limited powers over the territories7 and that the Fifth 
Amendment's due process clause protected property in slaves against 
congressional interference. 73 According to Chief Justice Taney, 
Congress was unable either to exclude slavery from a territory or to 
authorize a territorial le¥.;islature to do the same.74 Over strong 
dissents by Justices Curtis and McLean,76 the Court struck down the 
Missouri Compromise and recognized a positive constitutional right 
to slavelY. 77 in the territories for the first time in the history of the 
Republic. 78 
apparently disposed of the case on somewhat narrower grounds than did Taney's opinion. 
Accordingly, legal "historians have been unwilling to accept Taney's opinion as a 
definitive statement of what the Court decided." FEHRENBACHER, supra note 48, at 324. 
See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary 
Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 276 (1997). Regardless, six Justices 
agreed that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, and Chief Justice Taney's 
opinion, not the several opinions of the other members of the majority, became the focus 
of intense political debate prior to the Election of 1860. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 48, at 
324,389. 
70. Chief Justice Taney's view that blacks could not claim constitutional protection 
may have reflected the consensus of both the North and South. See, e.g., Graber, supra 
note 69, at 281. However, Justice Curtis developed an alternative notion of citizenship that 
held blacks were citizens within the meaning of Article JlI of the U.S. Constitution. See 
Streichler, supra note 66, at SIS. 
71. Scott, 60 U.S. at431-52. 
72. One author characterizes the "compact theory" of states rights which Chief Justice 
Taney used as quite radical, even in the context of southern antebellum political thought. 
See Brophy, supra note 60, at 193. 
73. See id. at 211 (conducting an extensive Fifth Amendment analysis). 
74. For a discussion of antebellum constitutional interpretation and its continuing 
relevance, see David Richards, Abolitionist Political and Constitutional Theory and the 
Reconstruction Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1992). 
75. For a thorough analysis of the argument in Justice Curtis's dissent, see Streichler, 
supra note 66; Eric T. Dean, Jr., Reassessing Dred Scott: The Possibilities of Federal 
Power in the Antebellum Context, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 713 (1992) (characterizing Justice 
Curtis's theory of federal power as radical in the context of the conflict of laws); Earl M. 
Maltz, The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Constitutional 
Law of Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1995 (1996) (Justice Curtis's prior opinions in 
slavery cases suggest that he was motivated less by any sympathy for abolitionist ideology 
than by a concern for comity). 
76. See Maltz, supra note 75, at 1995 (Justice McLean's rather loose legal argument 
was probably calculated to advance his presidential aspirations). 
77. See Brophy, supra note 60, at 221-25 (discussing the impact of Scott v. Sandford on 
the preservation of slavery in the states). 
78. The question of which theory of constitutional interpretation Chief Justice Taney 
employed to arrive at this conclusion, and thus which alternative theory would have 
rendered a more just conclusion, has spawned an extensive scholarly debate. See 
Christopher Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 
37, 63-5 (1993) (Chief Justice Taney's indifference to justice is typical of originalism); 
William Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 
1237, 1291 (1986) (conceding the role of original intent in Dred Scott, but seeking to 
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Instead of removing the issue of Congress' power over slavery in 
the territories from politics, the Dred Scott decision itself became a 
divisive political issue.79 In a June 2681 1857 address in Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln criticized the decision 0 and called on Republicans to 
oppose its force as a precedent. 8 I In his House-Divided speech he 
suggested that the Supreme Court might take its aggressive reasoning 
one step further and recognize a federal constitutional right to slave 
property, even in a free State: "We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming 
that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State 
free; and we shall awake to the realio/, instead, that the Supreme 
Court has made Illinois a slave State.,,8 During the Lincoln-Douglas 
debates in 1858, Lincoln repeatedly attacked Douglas for his support 
83 
of Dred Scott. 
Lincoln's criticisms of Dred Scott fueled fear of him and the 
Republican party. If Lincoln became President, he could appoint like-
minded territorial officers, who could then effectively prevent slave 
vindicate the theory); Cass Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, I GREEN BAG 2d 39 (1997) 
(arguing that the case demonstrates dangers of original intent jurisprudence). Indeed, 
Justice Thurgood Marshall held up Dred Scott as evidence of the framers' flawed moral 
views. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States 
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. I (1987); see also Diamond, supra note 52, at 130 
(expressing a view sympathetic to Justice Marshall but less critical of the framers). But see 
William Bradford Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 V AND. L. 
REV. 1343 (1987) (arguing that the principle fault of Chief Justice Taney's opinion is not 
its allegiance to the framers' values, but its loose interpretation). Two scholars have 
concluded that either a loose or a strict interpretation of the Constitution could have 
arrived at Chief Justice Taney's conclusion. See Finkelman, supra note 64, at 3-4; Graber, 
supra note 69, at 315. 
79. See Sunstein, supra note 78, at 41 (Dred Scott shows why the Supreme Court 
should avoid hearing politically controversial cases). 
80. See Speech at Springfield, lllinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF ABRAHAM LiNCOLN 398 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter 2 WORKS OF 
LINCOLN)' On Lincoln's analysis of the political nature of the ruling, see Finkelman, supra 
note 64, at 36. 
81. See Speech at Springfield, lllinois, supra note 80, at 401. Republicans tended to 
hold up Justice Curtis's dissent, rather than Justice McLean's, as the preferred alternative 
to Chief Justice Taney's constitutional argument. See Streichler, supra note 66, at 510. 
82. "A House Divided"; speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 6, 1858) in 2 WORKS OF 
LINCOLN, supra note 80, at 467. Some historians have argued that Lincoln was reckless in 
suggesting that a "second Dred Scott decision" could extend protection for slavery to the 
free States. After all, they have argued, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), 
indicated that the first eight amendments applied only to the federal government. Other 
historians have countered that, although Lincoln may have exaggerated any real danger in 
his House-Divided speech, lawyers frequently challenged Barron v. Baltimore in the 
antebellum period. Arguably, that case alone would not have prevented a Supreme Court 
intent on protecting slave property from recognizing a limited constitutional right to hold 
slaves in the free states. See KELLY, HARBISON & BELZ, supra note 47, at 286-87. 
83. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 48, at 492. For an insightful analysis of the 
strategy behind Lincoln's attack on Douglas, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF 
POLITICAL MANIPULATION 4-6 (1986). 
HeinOnline -- 26 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 519 2003
No.2] The "Irrevocable" Thirteenth Amendment 519 
owners from enjoying the protections promised by Dred Scott. 84 
Furthermore, Lincoln maintained that, ultimately, slavery had to end 
if the Union was to endure.85 Having conceded that Congress had no 
power over slavery in the States, he never spelled out how he 
intended to eliminate slavery there. To the South, Lincoln's public 
hostility to the Dred Scott decision indicated "that a Northern 
majority was unwilling to accord the South, a minority section, the 
rights to which it was entitled under the Constitution," and that a 
Republican administration might try to abolish slavery in the States.86 
For some or all of these reasons, by 1860 southern leaders were 
declaring that Lincoln's election would be followed by the secession 
87 
of the southern states. 
Lincoln won a sectional victory in the Election of 1860, defeating 
Douglas in the North and obtaining the electoral votes necessa~ for 
the Presidency.88 The South was largely ignored in this contest. 9 As 
one historian pointedly observed, there were really two Presidential 
elections in 1860: "Each section conducted its campaign very much as 
if the other section simply was not there.,,9o Lincoln's election was 
followed by the rapid secession of the deep South.91 South Carolina 
was the first to go, leaving the Union on December 20, 1860.92 By 
February, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
93 
Texas had seceded as well. As the House and the Senate debated the 
Corwin Resolution, eight other slave states considered whether to 
leave the Union.94 
84. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 48, at 541; see also SIMMS, supra note 54, at 117-
18. 
85. See KELLY, HARBISON & BELZ, supra note 47, at 284. Historians have also pointed 
out that the apotheosis of John Brown as a martyr in the North after his failed raid on 
Harper's Ferry alerted the South to the North's growing hostility towards slavery. See, 
e.g., POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 382. 
86. SIMMS, supra note 54, at 214-15. 
87. See POTTER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY, supra note 44, at 3. 
88. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 256 (1995). 
89. See id. ("It was ominous that Lincoln and Hamlin received not a single vote in ten 
of the Southern states."). 
90. POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 515. 
91. See DONALD, supra note 88, at 257. 
92. See KELLY, HARBISON & BELZ, supra note 47, at 291. 
93. See id.; KENNETH STAMP, AND THE WAR CAME: THE NORTH AND THE SECESSION 
CRISIS, 1860-61, at 13-45, 63-82 (1950). See generally Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another 
Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 2119-26 (2002) (discussing 
secession as a "constitutional crisis"). 
94. See A VERY CRAVEN, THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 434-35 (2d ed. 1957) ("The 
secession of the Cotton Kingdom and the formation of the Confederate States of America 
left the Border States suspended geographically, and emotionally as well, between two 
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 
In December 1860, special compromise committees were appointed 
in both Houses of Congress.95 The Senate's "Committee of Thirteen" 
proved to be more politically prominent than the House Committee of 
Thirty-three; the Committee of Thirteen boasted a more impressive 
membership, including Senators Douglas, Seward, Wade, and 
Jefferson Davis.96 That committee drafted the Crittenden Resolutions, 
which became the center of debate in the Winter of 1861.97 
The Committee of Thirteen crippled itself, however, with a 
severely restrictive procedural rule requiring a dual maiority of both 
the five Republicans and the other eight members. 8 This rule, 
proposed by Jefferson Davis, reflected the powerful notion that a 
successful compromise measure would require bipartisan support.99 In 
practice, however, it meant that the Republican members of the 
Committee were able to stall the progress of the Crittenden 
Resolutions, which were in turn rejected on the floor of the Houseloo 
101 
and the Senate. 
Representative Corwin eventually shepherded his proposal through 
the House, securing the required two-thirds on February 28. 102 Three 
days later, the Senate approved the Corwin Resolution with the 
necessary two-thirds majority, without a vote to spare. 103 The Corwin 
Resolution succeeded where the Crittenden Resolutions had failed 
because it won significant Republican support. Even Lincoln had 
indicated that he was not opposed to it. l04 Two states, Ohio, 
uncertain extremes. "). 
95. See KELLY, HARBISON & BELZ, supra note 47, at 292. 
96. Davis served in the Senate until he announced Mississippi's secession and withdrew 
on January 21, 1861. Less than a month later, he was inaugurated President of the 
Confederacy. 5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 127 (Allen Johnson & Dumas 
Malone eds., 1930). See also VAN DEUSEN, supra note 47, at 243. 
97. See POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 530. 
98. See id. 
99. See id. at 530-31; see also VAN DEUSEN, supra note 47, at 239. 
100. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1261 (1861). 
101. ld. at 1405. 
102. ld. at 1285. 
103. !d. at 1403. 
104. Although he consistently declared that he was "inflexible" on the issue of slavery 
in the territories, Lincoln communicated his willingness to support the Corwin Resolution 
to Republican leaders in Congress. See POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 550. 
Lincoln made his position on the Corwin Resolution public in his First Inaugural Address. 
There he said that the content of the Corwin Resolution was already "implied 
constitutional law," and that he had "no objection to its being made express, and 
irrevocable." First Inaugural Address-Final Text (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 WORKS OF 
LINCOLN, supra note 45, at 270. See also DONALD, supra note 88, at 268; VAN DEUSEN, 
supra note 47, at 243; DAMON WELLS, STEPHEN DOUGLAS: THE LAST YEARS, 1857-
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Maryland, and purportedly a third, Illinois, ratified the Corwin 
Resolution before the Civil War intervened. lOS 
A. Debate in the House of Representatives 
On February 27, Representative Thomas Corwin, a Republican 
from Ohio, brought a draft of his Resolution from the Committee of 
Thirty-three to the floor of the House. 106 That draft referred to slavery 
as "the relation between [State] citizens and those described in section 
second of the first article of the Constitution as 'all other persons. ",107 
The final version protected the "domestic institutions" within a State, 
"including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said 
State.,,108 Although one representative sarcastically noted that the 
revised language apparently protected other unknown and unnamed 
"domestic institutions," 109 Corwin offered no explanation for 
amending his resolution,. and the House treated the amendment as a 
I I·· h Ilu pure y sty IStIC c ange. 
The House then proceeded to a vote. With 123 votes in favor and 
71 against, the Corwin Amendment fell just short of the necessary 
two-thirds. III After a rowdy struggle for control of the floor, 
Representative David Kilgore, a Rep'ublican from Indiana, moved to 
adjourn and reconsider the vote later. I 12 
This delay proved to be an astute maneuver. On the next day, after 
little debate, the Corwin Resolution won two-thirds in the House. 113 
When Kilgore first renewed his motion to reconsider, he spoke briefly 
in support of the Resolution, noting that it deftly' avoided adding the 
words "slave" or "slavery" to the Constitution. 114 He reminded his 
fellow Republicans that they had consistently renounced any intention 
1861, at 265-66 (1971). 
lOS. See KELLY, HARBISON & BELZ, supra note 47, at 293. The legislatures of Ohio 
and Maryland ratified the Corwin Amendment, as did a constitutional convention in 
Illinois. Resort to a convention in Illinois "arguably violated the terms set by Congress for 
[the] adoption [of the Corwin Amendment] (which required the vote of the state 
legislature)." RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE 
CONSTITUTION So MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 92 (1993). 
106. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1263 (1861). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1264. 
110. See DONALD, supra note 88, at 268 (equating the phrase "domestic institutions of 
the states" with slavery). 
III. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1264 (1861). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1285. 
114. Id. at 1283. 
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to interfere with slavery in the South, and concluded that he was 
"willing that that principle shall be engraved upon the Mountain 
rocks, to endure for all time.,,115 Representative Kilgore assumed 
without argument that, if the Corwin Resolution were ratified, it 
would prevent future use of Article V to regulate or abolish slavery. 116 
Similarly, Representative Stanton, a Republican of Ohio who also 
spoke in favor of the Corwin Resolution, viewed control over slavery 
as an aspect of state sovereignty, to be protected forever from federal 
interference as a matter of principle: 
[I]f 1 were to-day a citizen of a slaveholding State, and were 
desirous of the emancipation of the slaves in that State, 1 would 
resist the interference of the General Government; because it is a 
subject which the General Government does not understand, over 
which ifpught to have no control, and which ought to be left to the 
States. 
Stanton also assumed that the Corwin Resolution would be binding 
on future generations. He recognized that a foreseeable shift in the 118 balance of power between the slave States and the free States 
would soon give free States the three-fourths majority necessary to 
amend the Constitution. While Stanton and his fellow Republicans 
disclaimed any desire to affect slavery in the States, the South needed 
a constitutional amendment to protect slavery from "the progress of 
public opinion in the free States.,,119 
Whatever Representative Kilgore did to effect a chan!1e in opinion 
during the intervening twenty-four hours, it worked. 20 First, he 
obtained a majority for the motion to reconsider, which fell one vote 
short of two-thirds at 128/65. 121 Over the protests of dissenters, the 
Speaker of the House concluded that a simple majority was enough to 
carry the motion, even though the underlying resolution required two-
thirds. 122 Then Kilgore miraculously produced five more votes for the 
Corwin Resolution itself, which passed with a vote of 133/65 on 
115. Id. 
116. [d. 
117. Id. at 1284. 
118. That foreseeable shift in power would, according to Stanton, be a product of both 
secession and the expectation that more free States would be organized out of the 
territories. Id. 
119. [d. 
120. See BERNSTEIN, supra notc 105, at 91 (speculating that the House reversed itself on 
the Corwin Amendment "because its members [probably] realized that nothing else 
available to them had any chance of success."). 
121. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1284 (1861). 
122. See id. 
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123 
February 28. 
B. Debate in the Senate 
523 
With Lincoln's impending inauguration on Monday, March 4, time 
would run out on the Thirty-sixth Congress. 124 By the end of February 
the House had voted down the Crittenden Resolutions l25 and had 
adjourned until Inauguration Day. Fading hopes for compromise 
rested on the Corwin Resolution, brought from the House to the 
Senate floor on March 2, 186l. 126 Senator Douglas, the Illinois 
Democrat who ran against Lincoln in both 1858 and 1860, introduced 
the Corwin Resolution in the Senate and championed it throughout 127 
the debate. 
Most Senators conceded that the Corwin Resolution, standing 
alone, could not save the Union. 128 Some doubted that it could be 
ratified before the sectional crisis would be resolved by other 
means.
129 
Nonetheless, on Sunday, March 3, the eve of Lincoln's 
inauguration, the debate in the Senate continued well into the night. 130 
Having devoted three months to compromise, the Senate needed to 
produce some tangible result. Anything else would have amounted to 
a concession that the congressional session had been an utter failure. 
Similarly, individual Senators competed to establish a transcript 
that would acquit them in the court ofhistory.131 They expected future 
generations to look back upon the period between Lincoln's election 
and his inauguration in an attempt to place blame for the failure to 
reach a compromise. In the debate over the Corwin Resolution, 
Senators took to the floor to establish that their respective political 
parties or constituencies were not responsible for whatever tragic 
123. Id. at 1285. See also POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 550. 
124. Lincoln's inauguration had symbolic importance as well. It shifted the nation's 
attention from compromise efforts in Congress to the new and controversial President and 
his policy toward secession. See POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 564. 
125. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1261 (1861). 
126. !d. at 1364. 
127. Id.; WELLS, supra note 104, at 259-91. 
128. See POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 553 ("[I]t was the territorial 
aspect of the Crittenden compromise [proposal] that Republicans rejected most 
emphatically and that southerners demanded most insistently."); infra text accompanying 
notes 162-168. 
129. See CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1365 (1861) (remarks of Senator 
Clingman). 
130. See POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 551. 
131. See id. at 522, 529. 
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events were to come in the months ahead. 132 
That debate is of enduring constitutional significance because many 
Senators considered whether the Corwin Resolution could legally 
bind future generations. An understanding of that constitutional 
debate, however, requires knowledge of the complex political 
positions that developed in response to the proposed amendment. The 
Corwin Resolution divided the Republican Party.133 At the same time, 
many Democrats who spoke against it, perhaps in an effort to belittle 
it and obtain more desirable alternatives, ultimately voted for it. 134 
The constitutional arguments advanced on both sides must be 
understood in light of their underlying political objectives. Finally, 
the Senate debate provides a twenty-first century reader with a 
window into the beleaguered politics of 1861. 
1. Political Positions on the Corwin Resolution 
The language of the Corwin Resolution implied that Congress did 
not have the constitutional capacity to emancipate the southern slaves, 
and not one Senator challenged that proposition.1 35 Throughout the 
debate, no Senator suggested that Congress retained the power if not 
the resolve to abolish slavery in the States. 136 
Many radical Republicans who would later play pivotal roles in the 
framing and ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments 
proclaimed that the South's fears were fanciful because Congress 
lacked the power under the Constitution to outlaw slavery. According 
to the prevailing interpretations of Article I, § 8, the Constitution did 137 
not grant Conrress power to regulate slavery. Moreover, the Tenth 
Amendment l3 provided added security. For example, Senator Ben 
132. See id. at 522. 
133. See infra text accompanying notes 171-77. 
134. See infra text accompanying notes 151-64. 
135. See infra text accompanying notes 137-50. 
136. Of course, Congress had considered that issue many times before. For example, in 
1790 the House adopted a report declaring that Congress had "no authority to interfere in 
the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of the States." WILLIAM 
M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 95 
(1977); see also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY 
GENERATION 81-119 (200 I ) (exploring the context and importance of the 1790 debate in 
the House of Representatives). 
137. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM SOUTH 26 (1956) ("The Federal Constitution . . . accepted slavery as local 
institution to be protected or prohibited according to the wishes of the individual states."). 
138. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST., amend. X. 
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Wade, a Republican from Ohio, conceded that the South's peculiar 
institution was shielded from congressional meddling: "You have got 
a double guarantee [in the Constitution]: first, the power was never 
delegated; and then, negatively~ as the power was not delegated, it 
U9 belongs to you and your State." 
Similarly, Senator Lyman Trumbull, a Republican from Illinois, 
agreed that Congress had no power over slavery in the South. He 
noted that the "Federal Government was one of delegated, not of 
inherent, powers.,,140 In his view the Constitution did not grant to the 
Government the "power to interfere with the domestic institutions of 
any State.,,141 Senator Trumbull noted that the proposition that 
Congress lacked power over slavery in the States was beyond dispute: 
"there is no man of any party who contends that Congress has 
authority to interfere with slavery in the States.,,142 For good measure, 
both Lincoln and the Chicago platform of the Republican party had 
renounced any intention to ever interfere with slavery in the States. 143 
The unanimity of opinion within the leadership of both parties on 
this matter is striking. Abolitionists had long argued that Congress 
had a constitutional duty to abolish slavery under the Guarantee 
Clause of Article IV, Section 4.144 Moreover, modem Commerce 
Clause decisions have shown that the language of the Constitution 
could be read broadly to give Congress the power to control slavery, 
even without the Thirteenth Amendment. 145 Even under the 
nineteenth century's more restrained reading of the Commerce 
Clause, one might have expected that interstate markets in slaves 
would have been subject to regulation by Congress. Two members of 
the Supreme Court, however, had already come to the opposite 
139. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1382 (1861). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. Senator Trumbull noted that, for this reason, the Constitution sheltered the 
North from moral responsibility for slavery. Lacking the power to abolish it, white citizens 
in the North could not be held accountable for slavery: "we ... have no more to do with 
slavery in Kentucky, than we have with slavery in Turkey." [d. 
142. [d. 
143. See ELBERT B. SMITH, THE DEATH OF SLAVERY: THE UNITED STATES, 1837-65, 
at 164-65 (1967). 
144. According to this argument, the guarantee of a Republican form of government 
included a guarantee of certain natural rights, such as life, liberty, and property, because 
these rights were essential to Republican government. See WlECEK, supra note 136, at 
268-70 (discussing Guarantee Clause and a number of other abolitionist constitutional 
arguments). 
145. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (reading the commerce clause 
expansively to permit congressional regulation of what was previously thought to be 
purely intra-state activity). 
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conclusion. In a special concurring opinion in Groves v. Slaughter, 146 
Justice McLean of Ohio concluded that Congress had no power under 
Article I, § 8 to regulate even the interstate trade in slaves. 147 He 
argued that slaves were "persons," not articles of commerce, for the 
purposes of the Constitution. Therefore, States had exclusive power to 
regulate even interstate commerce in slaves.
148 Chief Justice Taney 
agreed with that conclusion. 149 Thus, two members of the Court, 
representing both North and South, had recognized a slavery 
. C" 150 exception to ongress power over mterstate commerce. 
Ironically, some of the most passionate speeches against the 
Corwin Resolution came from southern Democrats who eventually 
voted for it. This behavior provides us with some insight into the 
complex politics of 1861. Although the House had already voted 
down the Crittenden Resolutions and, having adjourned, was 
effectively precluded from reconsidering them, they were introduced 
during the Senate debate in the form of a sweeping amendment to the 
Corwin Resolution. 151 Even though the Crittenden Resolutions could 
not have been submitted to the States for ratification, some Senators 
argued that the symbolic value of a meaningless Senate vote in their 
favor would have greater persuasive force in the South than actually 
submitting the Corwin Resolution to the States for ratification. 152 
Undoubtedly, hostile reaction to the Corwin Resolution must have 
been a negotiation strategy; some southern Democrats probably 
criticized the Corwin Resolution in an effort to win greater 
concessions from the Republicans. Other southern Democrats may 
have attacked the proposal in floor speeches in an effort to persuade 
other Senators to abandon or vote against the measure, thinking that 
the proposal's failure would undermine the symbolic force of the 
North's gesture towards compromise and place the blame for the 
146. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 503 (1841) (declining to decide the issue of whether the 
Commerce Clause applied to slavery). 
147. See Brophy, supra note 60, at 202,212 (placing Groves v. Slaughter in legal and 
historical context). 
148. Groves, 40 U.S. at 505-06. 
149. /d. at 507-08. In another concurring opinion Justice Baldwin concluded that slaves 
were articles of commerce and that Congress had power over the interstate slave trade. Id. 
at 512-26. 
150. See generally CURRIE, supra note 63, at 222-25 (discussing Groves v. Slaughter); 
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants. Slaves, and 
Articles of Commerce, 61 Mo. L. REv. 743, 807-12 (1996) (placing Groves within the 
context of an extended nineteenth-century legal dispute about the status of persons as 
articles of commerce). 
151. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387 (1861). 
152. See, e.g., id. (remarks of Senator Bigler). 
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Senate's failure to resolve the sectional crisis squarely on northern 
Republicans. Judging from their comments on the Senate floor, these 
southern Democrats may have preferred no compromise whatsoever 
to the "partial" compromise embodied in the Corwin Resolution. As 
always, different Senators undoubtedly had different reasons for 
similar behavior. When forced to a vote, however, it was apparently 
impossible for any southern Democrats to explain to their constituents 
a vote against a proposed amendment that promised to protect slavery 
within the existing slave states. Accordingly, in the final tally, no 
Democrats voted against the Corwin Resolution. 153 Some today might 
be surprised to learn that the South would not have been satisfied with 
an express constitutional guarantee for slavery where it already 
existed. As noted above, however, for at least the preceding decade, 
political agitation over slavery had been channeled into the debate 
about Congress' power over the territories. Lincoln had attacked Dred 
Scott and had insisted that Congress could and should prohibit slavery 
in the territories. 154 His election meant that the South had finally 
suffered defeat with respect to that issue. Largely to save face, and 
partially out of habit, southern leaders wanted the North to renounce 
part of that victory by agreeing to constitutional guarantees for 
slavery in the territories. 155 The Republicans strongly resisted such a 
proposal, perhaps out of fear of southern expansion. 156 Because the 
Corwin Resolution did not address the issue of slavery in the 
territories, however, it perhaps appeared to be too painless a 
concession by the northern Republicans to win the South's 
h .. 157 ent uSlast!c support. 
Senator James M. Mason, a Virginia Democrat, made that point 
dramatically. He noted that a plank in the Chicago platform of the 
Republican Party disavowed any intention to interfere with slavery in 
the States. 158 He continued: "the [Corwin] resolution ... in order to 
quiet the apprehensions in the southern States on the subject of 
slavery, is to make that plank ... a part of the Constitution.,,159 He 
recharacterized the Corwin Resolution as the North's refusal "to deny 
153. R. Alton Lee, The Corwin Amendment in the Secession Crisis, OHIO HI ST. Q. 1,24 
(1961) (observing that all the senators voting against the Corwin Resolution were 
Republicans). 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86. 
ISS. POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 553. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387 (1861). 
159. Id. 
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to Congress the right of interference with slavery in the territories.,,16o 
He concluded with a stinging metaphor. By proposing a 
constitutional amendment that did not address the issue dividing the 
Union, the Republicans offered a Rlacebo, a bread pill, in order to 
calm the South through deception. I He declared that the bread pill 
would not work because the South would not be deceived.
162 
He 
predicted that his home State of Virginia would "not be influenced 
one hair's breadth by the passage of this joint resolution.,,163 
Notwithstanding this angry criticism, Senator Mason ultimately voted 
fi h C · I' 164 or t e orwm Reso utton. 
Even Senators who spoke on behalf of the Corwin Resolution 
admitted that its value was largely symbolic. Senator Bigler, a 
Democrat from Pennsylvania, stated that the Corwin Resolution 
would be valuable solely because it was a declaration that the 
Constitution shall not be changed, "which, coming from the other 
side, I agree may be of some temporary value to the country.,,165 
Senator Douglas, the Senate's champion of the Corwin Resolution, 
attempted to answer Senator Mason by saying that the Resolution 
would have value as evidence that the North was not hostile towards 
the South and its institution of slavery: "if the northern States will by 
a three fourths majority come forward and insert this clause in the 
Constitution, it proves conclusive~ that there is no such sentiment 
[in] the North as you apprehend.,,16 
Some southern Senators resisted the Corwin Resolution because 
they saw it as an attempt to divide the border States from the deep 
South. At this time, eight slave States had not ~et decided whether to 
stay with the Union or join the Confederacy. I 7 Senator Johnson, an 
Arkansas Democrat, urged the "gentlemen of the South" to stand 
together until the North agreed to "a full and fair settlement of the 
whole fl,uestion, that would bring back all the southern States to" the 
Union. I 8 While Senator Johnson did not say what the "whole 




163. ld. at 1389. 
164. ld. at 1403. See also POTTER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY, supra note 44, at 200-01 
(characterizing Senator Mason as among "the more rabid type of secessionist"). 
165. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387 (1861). 
166. ld. at 1388. 
167. ld. at 1365. 
168. ld. 
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slavery 10 the territories. Other southern Senators concurred in 
Senator Johnson's view, that the Corwin Resolution was "an 
inducement to half the southern States to separate themselves from 
the rest.,,169 And one historian has concluded that at least some 
Republican leaders pursued a divide and conquer strategy against the 
South throu!!h compromise proposals such as the Corwin 
R I · 17(t"' eso utlOn. 
The Corwin Resolution also divided the Republican Party. It was 
the product of a Republican drafter and Republican initiative in the 
House. Nonetheless, some Republicans simply would not cast a vote 
for slavery. For example, Senator Trumbull conceded that Congress 
lacked the power to interfere with slavery in the States. Yet he refused 
to act in support of that institution. "No sir," he declared, "no human 
being shall ever be made a slave by my vote.,,171 
Senator Trumbull's position appeals to a twenty-first century 
reader, and given the moral convulsions over slavery in the 1850s, 
one wonders why the position was not more prevalent in the winter of 
186l. The question presupposes the twenty-first century's values with 
respect to racial equality, which, as the Corwin Resolution 
demonstrates, were exceptional even among northern Republicans. 
Lincoln's victory did not reflect a mandate to abolish slavery. In fact, 
Lincoln supported the Corwin Resolution. l72 In 1861, the crisis 
between the sections focused on the issue of slavery in the 
territories. 173 The Senate was concerned first and foremost with that 
issue and the crisis of secession; the fate of black slaves in the South 
169. ld. (remarks of Senator Johnson). 
170. See. e.g.. POTIER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 530 (concluding that 
Charles Francis Adams embraced compromise efforts in the winter of 1861 in an attempt 
to separate the border States from the deep South). 
171. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1382 (1861); see also id. at 1402 (remarks of 
Senator Wilson). 
172. POTIER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 550. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 57-84. This observation about the focus of 
political debate in early 1861 is not a denial that slavery constituted an ultimate cause of 
the war. See David Brion Davis, Free at Last: The Enduring Legacy of the South's Civil 
War Victory, N.Y. TIMES, August 26, 2001, at D1 (asserting that "though the South lost 
the battles, for more than a century it attained its goal: that the role of slavery in America's 
history be thoroughly diminished, even somehow removed as a cause of the war"); see 
also David Brion Davis, Looking at Slavery from Broader Perspectives, \05 AM. HIST. 
REv. 452, 455 (2000) (noting that "for many generations historians and schoolbooks 
virtually ignored the central problem of slavery and freedom"). See generally PETER 
KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877, at 201 (1993) (providing an overview 
incorporating insights of recent historical scholarship on the institution of slavery and its 
role in American history). 
HeinOnline -- 26 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 530 2003
530 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 26 
was of secondary importance to the nation's political leadership. 174 
Although most of the debate over the Corwin Resolution was 
superficially race-neutral, Senator Baker, an Oregon Republican, 
made explicit what was implicit in the proposed amendment. Senator 
Baker declared that, although he ardently hoped for the emancipation 
of the black slaves in the South, his "desire for the elevation of 
masses of men, of whatever creed, or race, or color, or kind, is to be 
limited by other conditions of government and race.,,175 He conceded 
that the needs of his own race were his highest priority: "I am of the 
white race, and I love their interests and their honor best.,,176 
Senator Baker's comments might partially explain why no 
Congressman resisted the Corwin Resolution because he intended to 
fight for a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.177 
Admittedly, Senator Trumbull's comments could be understood as 
expressing reluctance to prevent such an amendment in the future. 
Certainly, the political coalition behind the Thirteenth Amendment 
had to come from somewhere. Nonetheless, the debate over the 
Corwin Resolution suggests that the political climate with respect to 
abolition changed rapidly between 1861 and 1865, as emancipation 178 became a central war measure. 
The various political arguments discussed above depended on 
contradictory assumptions about the legal force of the proposed 
amendment. The constitutional issues were inextricably intertwined 
with the political ones. Indeed several Senators realized this and 
confronted the constitutional issue directly. 
2. Constitutional Challenge to the Corwin Resolution 
During the truncated floor debate in the House, Representatives 
Kilgore and Stanton apparently assumed that, if the Corwin 
Resolution was ratified by the States, it would be legally binding on 
future generations, preventing them from ever amending the 
174. See, e.g., KOLCHIN, supra note 173, at 201 (stressing that re-union rather than 
emancipation was the predominant northern goal at the war's outset). 
175. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1386 (1861). 
176. Id. 
177. One Congressman articulated this position when explaining his vote on another 
issue. Representative Sedgwick sought an amendment that would give Congress 
"constitutional authority to abolish slavery." CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1258 
(1861). 
178. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863-77, at I-II, 60-88 (1988) (discussing development of abolitionist 
sentiment during the War). 
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Constitution to abolish slavery.179 In the more exhaustive debate in 
the Senate, however, that issue was the subject of considerable 
controversy. 
Senator Bigler, a Democrat of Pennsylvania, put the question 
squarely before the Senate. He asserted that the Corwin Resolution 
"in truth amounts to nothing but a mere declaration.,,18o He insisted 
that subsequent generations could always use Article Y to amend or 
repeal the Corwin Amendment: "the article itself remains liable to 
change under the same rule as any other portion of the 
Constitution.,,181 Senator Clingman endorsed Bigler's comments, 
calling the Corwin Resolution a "mere nullity.,,182 
Senator Douglas resisted Bigler's characterization of the Corwin 
Resolution and insisted that it would be legally binding. Senator 
Douglas noted that by its own terms, the proposed amendment was 
"unalterable.,,183 After its ratification, "it will not be in the power of 
any number of States, short of a unanimous vote, ever to interfere 
with the question of slavery in the States.,,184 Douglas had said that he 
was only expressing an opinion and that he did not wish at that time 
to make a legal argument in support of it. 18s Nonetheless, Senator 
Mason challenged Douglas to put forward "authority" for his 
conclusion that the Corwin Amendment would be "irrepealable, 186 
except by the consent of all the States." In response, Douglas 
argued that, if it became part of the Constitution, the Corwin 
Amendment would control the meaning of Article Y, "which 
authorizes amendments in certain cases, and prohibits . . . making 
amendments in certain other cases.,,187 Once ratified, the Corwin 
Amendment would "be just as sacred as" the final clause of Article 
y188, which declares that "no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived ofit's [sic] equal Suffrage in the Senate.,,189 
179. See supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text. 
180. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387 (1861). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. See also id. at 1367 (remarks of Senator Pugh); id. at 1392 (remarks of Senator 
Morrill). 




187. [d. at 1388. 
188. [d. at 1387. For another version of these same arguments, see the brief exchange 
between Pugh and Simmons.ld. at 1367. 
189. U.S. CONST., art. V. 
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"Just precisely," Senator Mason answered, "not more so. ,,190 
Asserting that no one could deny "that the power which makes a 
Constitution can unmake it," Senator Mason concluded that the 
provision protecting a State's representation in the Senate was not 
legally binding either. 191 According to Senator Mason, three-fourths 
of the States retained the power to alter the Constitution. That power 
extended to any part of the Constitution, including both the last clause 
of Article V and the Corwin Resolution. 
Senator Benjamin F. Wade echoed Senator Mason. Wade implied 
tvat an amendment under Article V was legitimate because it was an 
act of a special constitutional convention, vested with the same power 
as the Constitutional Convention of 1787. 192 "[O]ne convention 
[cannot] tie the hands or lessen the power of one that is to come after 
it.,,193 Senator Wade supported this conclusion with an analogy to the 
inherent limits on the powers of a legislature, such as the U.S. 
Congress: "We can pass no laws here that a subsequent Legislature 
cannot repeal, because they all sit with equal powers.,,194 Therefore, 
the Corwin Resolution, and presumably the last clause of Article V as 
well, were subject to change according to Article V procedures. 
Senator Wade concluded that "the idea that this [resolution] shall 
never be altered I do not think means anything.,,195 
These answers to Senator Douglas were less than thoroughly 
satisfying; thW read the last clause of Article V out of the 
Constitution. 19 Senator Douglas was right to point to that provision 
for support. It indicated that the founders endorsed a theory of 
sovereignty that somehow allowed them to remove certain issues 
from the confines of Article V. Part IV of this article will argue that 
the founders, who were self-conscious extralegal actors, could set 
substantive limits on amendment that "routine" use of Article V could 
not. Curiously, Senators Mason and Wade apparently ignored this 
possible distinction. 
Other Senators noted that, even if the Corwin Amendment would 
not be legally binding, it might prevent future amendments because of 
190. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387 (1861). 
191. Id. 




196. And yet they purported to preserve the force of Article V's procedural commands. 
See infra Part IV. 
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its persuasive force. Its ratification might create a decisive inertia 
against any future attempt to give Congress power over slavery. 
Senator James F. Simmons, a Whig from Rhode Island, argued that 
the States and their statesmen would keep a promise not to amend the 
Constitution in order to interfere with slavery in the States. 197 Once 
the necessary three-fourths of the States had ratified the Corwin 
Resolution "in the serious manner provided by the Constitution of the 
United States," they would never subsequently "deal in bad faith.,,198 
Even Senator Mason conceded that, once ratified, the Corwin 
Amendment would carry the ',)'ropriety of law-I mean of moral law 
... but ... nothing more.,,19 That Congress has never proposed an 
Amendment reducing a State's representation in the Senate arguably 
S S· , .. 200 supports enator Immons s posItion. 
Rather curiously, Senator George E. Pugh of Ohio, who had voiced 
his opposition to the Corwin Resolution at every opportunity, argued 
that it would be ineffective because it had been poorly drafted.201 
Knowing that any change in the language of the Corwin Resolution 
would kill it because the House had adjourned, Pugh first suggested a 
purely stylistic revision.202 After Senator Douglas, among others, 
exposed that suggestion as an attempt to bury the Corwin 
Resolution,203 Senator Pugh argued that the Resolution should have 
declared that it was exempt from amendment.204 No other Senators 
197. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1367 (1861). 
198.Id. 
199. Id. at 1387. For an exploration of both the nonnative and descriptive legal issues 
raised by a politician'S promises concerning future political action, see Saul Levmore, 
Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REv. 567 (1996). 
200. Then again history teaches us that any security provided by the mere expression of 
constitutional sentiment may be illusory. That the American polity was capable of 
producing the directly opposing super-majorities necessary for a constitutional flip-flop 
was demonstrated by the failed experiment of national prohibition of alcoholic beverages. 
Even in that context, however, many prominent proponents of repealing the Eighteenth 
Amendment-including Arthur Hadley (a president emeritus of Yale University), Walter 
Lippmann, and Clarence Darrow-initially concluded that repeal of a recently enacted 
amendment was a constitutional impossibility and, accordingly, urged the emerging 
consensus against national prohibition to engage in some fonn of "nullification." See 
DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 66-67 (2d ed. 2000). Of course 
such an extreme response proved unnecessary. See RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE 
EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 
1880-1920, at 270 (1995) ("By the early 1930s, the Voluntary Committee of Lawyers had 
overcome the idea that repeal was a constitutional impossibility and channeled the impetus 
for change into workable channels. "). 
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paid attention to the latter suggestion. Senator Pugh's comment 
missed the Constitutional issue: whether one generation could use 
Article V to prevent future generations from using Article V. If that 
power existed, then the Corwin Resolution would have exercised it. 
The Corwin Resolution u1timate~ won the required two-thirds, 
without so much as a vote to spare.
2 
That the Thirty-sixth Congress 
took such an extraordinary step towards giving slavery special 
constitutional status provides insight into the troubled politics of the 
winter of 1861. As one historian concluded, the Corwin Resolution 
established "that what the South wanted most was reassurance," and 
that both the North and the South desperately wanted "to make any 
sectional settlement afinal one.,,206 
IV. EFFICACY OF THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 
The Civil War preempted efforts to ratify the Corwin Resolution.207 
Thus, the arguments in the Senate about whether it was irrevocable 
d 208 h' . I h . b were never teste. T IS sectIOn ana yzes t at questIOn y 
considering a number of instructive legal analogies and concludes that 
the Corwin Amendment could have been validly overridden by 
subsequent amendment. 
The congressional debate concerning the Corwin Resolution 
marked an important constitutional moment insofar as it sparked 
discussion of whether the Constitutional Convention of 1787 set 
binding substantive limits on the power of amendment. During this 
debate, Senator Douglas argued that the Corwin Resolution would 
limit the amending power as did the last clause of Article V, which 
205. Id. at 1403. 
206. POTTER, IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 44, at 532. 
207. Three non-confederate States purported to ratify the Corwin Amendment before 
support for its ratification subsided as fears of civil war became a reality. See KELLY, 
HARBISON & BELZ, supra note 47, at 293; KYVIG, supra note 5, at 151. The two-hundred-
plus-year ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment presents the question of the 
(theoretical) vitality of the Corwin Resolution-i.e., assuming (counterfactually) a desire 
to do so, could the state legislatures still ratify the Corwin Amendment? As Professor 
Paulsen has observed, so long as the amendment were given a literal construction, it would 
lack any practical effect even were it now to be ratified. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 699 
n.79. 
208. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), the Court let stand Congress' 
determination that the Child Labor Amendment had not been ratified. There, the Court 
concluded that questions concerning the validity of proposed constitutional amendments 
were non-justiciable. See id. at 454. More recently, however, scholars have challenged this 
conclusion. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: 
Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 397-98 (1983); Paulsen, supra 
note 3, at 706-17. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 535 2003
No.2] The "Irrevocable" Thirteenth Amendment 535 
protected a State's representation in the Senate.209 Senator Mason 
responded that neither restriction was irrevocable.2lo Declaring that 
"the power which makes a Constitution can unmake it," he assumed 
that Article V ratifying conventions had the same power as the 1787 
C . 211 onventlOn. 
To the extent that Senator Mason ignored a distinction between the 
two entities, his argument proved too much. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, this argument would have established that the 1787 
Convention had no power to bind future generations with Article V 
itself. Under Senator Mason's theory, not only did that convention 
lack the power to prohibit future amendments depriving a state of its 
representation in the Senate,212 but it also was incapable of 
establishing exclusive procedures for amendment. If the 1787 
Convention was not extraordinary, then it could not prevent future 
generations from changir& the fundamental law through a popular 
referendum, for example. 
The 1787 Convention was extraordinary, however. That 
Convention had extraordinary powers, greater than the powers of the 
state legislatures or conventions that act under Article V, because the 
1787 Convention was a revolutionary institution.214 It was self-
consciously extralegal; it did not conform to the procedures for 
amending the Articles of Confederation and did not claim legitimacy 
because of the Articles. Instead, the delegates to that Convention 
conceded that they were revolutionaries. They invoked the 
sovereignty of the people, and looked to the ratifying conventions and 
the court of history for vindication.215 Because they did not rely on the 
Articles for legitimacy, they were not bound by its restrictions but 
instead exercised the extraordinary powers of revolutionary 
constitution makers. 
Those extraordinary powers allowed the 1787 Convention to 
209. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. 
211. CONGo GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1387 (1861). 
212. However, if the clause protecting a State's representation in the Senate has any 
real meaning, then it cannot be circumvented by Article V amendment. Were this clause 
itself subject to amendment, it would be possible to deprive a State of its representation in 
the Senate without its consent simply by adding an introductory section to the proposed 
amendment repealing the last clause of Article V. 
213. See infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of 
amending the Constitution by a national referendum). 
214. Cf Kay, supra note 19, at 64-67 (discussing the "legal incapacity" of the 
Philadelphia Convention of 1787). 
215. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
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prescribe the procedural rules for, and put substantive limitations on, 
"routine" amendment. A routine amendment claims legitimacy under 
the Constitution, and its validity is determined by whether its framers 
followed the procedures prescribed in the Constitution. It is logically 
inconsistent to claim authority on the basis of some of the text of 
Article V while at the same time ignoring the Article's limiting 
language. Accordingly, a routine amendment must not violate any 
prohibitions in the original document, such as the Constitution's 
prohibition on reducing a State's representation in the Senate without 
its consent. 
To say that an extralegal convention, which is eventually 
vindicated by historical practice, can prescribe rules for routine 
amendment, is not to say that it has the power finally to determine the 
fate of future generations. A constitution is forever subject to the 
same revolutionary revision that created it, and thus future 
generations always have the power to repudiate the existing 
constitution and create a new one. But in such a case the new 
constitution's drafters cannot claim legitimacy based on the old 
regime while at the same time eradicating it. In throwing out the old 
constitution and acting outside the realm of routine amendment, they 
act outside of the law. That constitution will be legitimate only if it 
expresses the sovereign will of the people.216 
Of course, that the 1787 Convention had the power to impose limits 
on routine amendments did not prove, as Senator Douglas apparently 
assumed, that the framers of the Corwin Resolution had that same 
power. The 1787 Convention set forth the rules for routine 
amendment in Article V. The framers of the Corwin Resolution 
claimed that it would be legally binding because it had been enacted 
in conformity with Article V's requirements. They followed the 
formal procedures under Article V, and clothed themselves with the 
legitimacy of the existing Constitution. They did not claim to be 
extralegal actors with extraordinary powers. In essence, they tried to 
have their cake and eat it too, in that they sought the legitimacy of 
Article V as they attempted to change the Constitution in a way that 
I I · . ld 217 on y revo utlOnanes cou . 
216. Cf Kay, supra note 19, at 78-80 (discussing the rapid acceptance of the 
Constitution following its ratification). 
217. The proffered distinction between the authority invoked by the framers of Article 
V of the Constitution and the proponents of the Corwin Resolution also figures 
prominently in Professor Harris's analysis of the conceptual problems posed by an 
unamendable amendment. See HARRIS, supra note 53, at 188-9\. Although Professor 
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Because the framers of the Corwin Resolution claimed authority 
under Article V, the Corwin Resolution would have been irrevocable 
only if Article V gave them power to make an irrevocable 
amendment. As noted above, the 1787 Convention had the power to 
make provisions of the Constitution irrevocable (at least for so long as 
the Constitution remained the "supreme Law of the Land,,).218 The 
issue, then, is whether the 1787 Convention gave that power to 
Article V ratifying conventions. Article V is silent with respect to 
changing the procedures for or limitations on future amendments. 
Explicitly, it prohibits amendments that deprive a State of its 
representation in the Senate without its consent. Arguably, that one 
explicit limit creates a negative implication that Article V permits all 
other conceivable amendments.219 The better conclusion, however, is 
that a strong background presumption-against the use of Article V to 
limit a future generation's use of Article V-made an explicit 
prohibition of such amendments unnecessary. 
That background presumption existed because legal analogies 
suggested that a power sufficient to do a thing retained the capacity to 
undo it. If ratifying conventions in three-fourths of the States could 
pass an amendment, ratifying conventions in three-fourths of the 
States could repeal it as well. In the debate over the Corwin 
Resolution, Senator Wade suggested an analogy between ratifying 
conventions and legislatures. Just as one legislature could not prevent 
a later one from repealing its statutes, one set of Article V ratifying 
conventions could not prevent a subsequent one from undoing its 
Harris and I agree that Article V cannot be used to prohibit future use of Article V, 
Professor Harris concludes that an unamendable amendment could be added to the 
Constitution pursuant to the procedures reflected in Article VII of the Constitution. Id. at 
190-9\. He contends that adherence to Article VII procedures invokes the full power of the 
sovereign people because the founding generation deemed that process sufficient to 
supplant the Articles of Confederation and create new fundamental law, including the 
amending procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution. In my view, however, the 
distinction between the founders of 1787 and the advocates of the Corwin Resolution lies 
not so much in the disparity between Article V and Article VII procedures. Rather, the 
critical difference distinguishing them is that the founders frankly conceded the extralegal, 
revolutionary character of their action (and won adherence in spite of the fact), whereas 
the authors of the Corwin Resolution rested their claim to authority solely on compliance 
with the existing constitution's express procedural rules for amendment. 
218. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[t]his Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land"). 
219. Cj DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND 
CENTURY, 1888-1986, 177-78 n.47 (1990) (asserting in an analogous context that 
"[c]onsideration of the explicit limitations on the amending power contained in article V 
ought to have squelched the argument that the general authority to amend" was also 
cabined by implicit limits to be inferred from constitutional structure). 




Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 26 
Senator Wade might have relied on weighty authority for his 
conclusion with respect to legislatures. That one session of Congress 
lacked the power to bind a subsequent one could be traced to the 
British doctrine of Parliamentary omnipotence.22I Citing Sir Edward 
Coke, Blackstone declared that Parliament was vested with 
"transcendent and absolute" power, "sovereign and uncontrollable 
authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraininlfi abrogating, 
repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws." Following 
Blackstone, the distinguished Professor Dicey noted that although 
"Parliaments have more than once intended and endeavored to pass 
Acts which should tie the hands of their successors[,] . . . the 
endeavor has always ended in failure.,,223 
Senator Wade's analogy was powerful and instructive. Each 
session of Congress, like each session of Parliament, has the same 
power as its predecessors because it plays the same role in an existing 
constitutional system. Similarly, a set of Article V actors has power 
because it acts in accordance with the procedures and limitations of 
Article V, and thus plays the same role as its predecessors. 
Accordingly, it stands to reason that, like a legislature, a set of Article 
V actors must have the same legal powers as its predecessors. 
That background presumption serves as a default rule, which gives 
meaning to an otherwise ambiguous Article V. It sug~ests that Article 
V cannot be used to make an irrevocable amendment. 24 An amending 
220. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text. 
221. With respect to the state legislatures, this same point has been made by declaring 
that they could not give away their sovereign power. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 
814,819 (1880). In Stone the Supreme Court concluded that the Contracts Clause, U.S. 
CON ST. art. I, § 10, could not be read to deprive a State of its police power: "[n]o 
legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals." Id. at 819. The Court 
explained away earlier cases, which had held that the Contracts Clause prevented a 
legislature from reneging on a tax exemption, by declaring that, while the taxing power 
was incidental to the purposes of government, governments were created to exercise the 
police power. See CURRIE, supra note 219, at 218-19, 380. 
222. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 156 (emphasis added). 
223. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
65 (1959). In a recent case, however, the House of Lords upheld the supremacy of 
European Community Law over a 1988 Act of Parliament, suggesting that a 1972 
Parliament bound its successors when it passed the European Communities Act. Lord 
Bridge noted that "whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it 
enacted the European Communities Act of 1972 was entirely voluntary." Factortame Ltd. 
v. Sec'y of State (No.2), I A.C. 603,658-59 (HL 1991). That statement was the extent of 
the Lords' analysis, which obviously did not provide a very satisfactory rationale for such 
an exception to the centuries old doctrine of Parliamentary omnipotence. That doctrine had 
always prevented Parliament from voluntarily giving away its power. 
224. Professor Brandon rejects the notion that the Corwin Resolution would have been 
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procedure allowing one generation to bind the hands of their 
successors would have been inconsistent with the founders' 
experience of Parliamentary omnipotence.225 Therefore Senator 
Wade's conclusion that one generation cannot bind the hands of 
another must be correct as applied to one generation's attempt to use 
Article V to limit a future generation's use of Article V.226 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases rejecting arguments for other 
implicit limits on Article V are not to the contrary. In the National 
227 228. 
Prohibition Cases and Leser v. Garnett, the Court nghtfully 
rejected claims that the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments 
exceeded Article V's amending power because they invaded state 
sovereignty. Even if, as the complaining parties in the cases alleged, 
those amendments transferred to the federal government powers 
"unconstitutional" on the grounds that "it will rarely be possible to argue successfully that 
any amendment is unconstitutional." Brandon, supra note 53, at 234. Professor Brandon's 
conclusion flows from concerns about the persuasive, and perhaps coercive, force of any 
formal expression of a super-majority of the polity on a divisive constitutional issue. Id. at 
234-35. In particular, "given the relations among the Constitution's institutional actors, 
any expression of sentiment sufficiently strong to produce a constitutional amendment on 
a matter so fundamental would stand little chance of being successfully flouted by an 
established institution of government." Id. at 235. Professor Brandon's perceptive 
observations go more to the assessment of raw power than legitimacy. Indeed, Professor 
Brandon's analysis leaves him in the somewhat awkward position of asserting the 
constitutionality of the Corwin Resolution and at the same time conceding that it would 
have been powerless against a subsequent Article V amendment abolishing slavery. Id. at 
236 n.69. Ultimately, then, Professor Brandon's defense of the Corwin Resolution renders 
the proposed amendment a legal nullity. 
225. Cf THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND 
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING 126-27 (2000) (concluding 
that "any idea of unalterable constitutional norms" would have been inconsistent with the 
founders' commitment to popular sovereignty; "[t]he basically positivist idea of 
sovereignty, which in Great Britain has been attributed to Parliament, had now been 
attributed by the Constitution's leading defenders to the people of the United States."); see 
also Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American 
Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 780-81 (2001) (discussing tension between the concepts of 
inalienable rights and popular sovereignty). 
226. Because the amendment proposed in H.R.1. Res. 29, I06th Congo (1999), 
discussed in supra note 6 and accompanying text, did not purport to limit (but rather 
expand) the power of future generations to amend the Constitution, it would not have run 
afoul of the background presumption identified herein. Whether that proposed amendment 
would nevertheless change a "preconstitutional rule" or a "basic norm" in such a way as to 
make it revolutionary is a question beyond the scope of this article. See Kay, supra note 
19, at 58-62 (quoting in part H. KELSON, PURE THEORY OF LAW 46-48, 194-200 (1967»; 
Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 
148-52 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (applying Hans Kelsen's theory of the Grundnorm, 
or basic norm, to the procedures for constitutional amendment). 
227. 253 U.S. 350 (1920). 
228. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 
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traditionally reserved to the states,229 they did not attempt to prevent 
future generations from using Article V. They were routine 
amendments subject to repeal. Therefore, they did not require the 
Court to consider whether Article V could be used to make an 
amendment irrevocable. 
The Corwin Resolution tried to add another limitation to those 
imposed by the 1787 Convention. But the framers of the Corwin 
Resolution did not pretend to be revolutionaries, who, because of their 
extralegal status, had extraordinary powers. They could have achieved 
their goal of forever removing slavery from Article V only by 
revolutionary constitution-making, and that is not what they purported 
to do. 
V. CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 
The Corwin Amendment illustrates the importance of 
distinguishing between the natural right of revolution-the 
"unalienable" right of "the People" to make and alter their fonns of 
230 d h .. I d h .. government -an t e posltlve- aw power to amen t e constltutIOn 
granted by Article V. This distinction elucidates why the founders of 
the Constitution of 1787, expressly invoking the fonner authority, 
could impose limits on the power granted in Article V, whereas the 
framers of the Corwin Amendment, relying solely on the power 
granted by Article V, could not do so. 
This distinction similarly clarifies a significant, on-going debate 
among legal scholars, historians, and political theorists about the 
exclusivity of Article V. Although an exhaustive analysis of this 
debate, which has engaged many prominent scholars in recent years, 
is beyond the scope of this article, a precis of this analysis is set forth 
below in order to underscore the contemporary significance of the 
Corwin Amendment. This part of the article first provides a brief 
overview of the current scholarly debate about the exclusivity of 
Article V. It then employs the insights gleaned from the foregoing 
analysis of the Corwin Amendment in a critique of that scholarly 
debate. 
229. See CURRIE, supra note 219, at 177-78 n.47 (discussing National Prohibition 
Cases and Leser v. Garnett). 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 17-25 (discussing the founding generation's 
commitment to popular sovereignty). 
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A. Conflicting Understandings of Article V 
In numerous publications, Yale Law Professor Akhil Amar has 
developed a sophisticated, historical argument for the proposition that 
"We the People of the United States have a legal right to alter our 
government-to change our Constitution-via a majoritarian and 
populist mechanism akin to a national referendum, even though that 
mechanism is not explicitly specified in Article V.,,231 According to 
Professor Amar, this conclusion follows from the founding 
generation's core commitment to the concept that sovereignty 
ultimately resides in the people.232 He has argued that this 
commitment was reflected not only in the Declaration of 
Independence and other writings contemporary with the Constitution 
but also in several provisions of the Constitution itself.233 Thus, he 
concludes that during the years between 1776 and 1789, the 
revolutionary, natural right to alter and abolish forms of government, 
asserted in the Declaration of Independence, was transformed into a 
legal right to amend that document "by a peaceful and simple 
. . . "h "d ~ d 234 maJontanan process, suc as a natIOn-wi e releren urn. 
Professor Amar has cogently rebuffed the claim that his argument 
renders Article V a nullity. Rather, his position is merely that Article 
V is nonexclusive.235 Article V provides an alternative mechanism for 
constitutional change, "thus eliminat[ing] the necessity of future 
appeals to the People themselves. However, future appeals to the 
People remain sufficient, as a general matter, to effect constitutional 
change.,,236 Nor should Professor Amar be misunderstood as merely 
reaffirming an inalienable right of revolution. He insists that, apart 
from any claim based on natural rights or revolutionary theory, a 
majority of U.S. citizens has a legal right, implicitly guaranteed by 
231. Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 4, at 457. See also AMAR & HIRSCH, 
supra note 4, at 5-6; Amar, Popular Sovereignty, supra note 4; Amar, Philadelphia 
Revisited, supra note 4. 
232. See, e.g., AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 7 (arguing that the American founders 
widely believed that "the People are sovereign, and a majority of the people enjoy the 
inalienable legal right to alter or abolish their form of government whenever they deem 
fit."); Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 4, at 458 (asserting that "[bJetween the 
Revolution and the Constitution, popular sovereignty principles in America evolved 
beyond the Lockean core of the Declaration and established the legal right of the polity to 
alter or abolish their government at any time and for any reason, by a peaceful and simple 
majoritarian process."). 
233. See, e.g., Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 4, at 470-94; Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 4, at \050-60. 
234. Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 4, at 458. 
235. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 4, at \054. 
236. See id. (emphasis removed) (footnote omitted). 
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the Constitution, to amend the Constitution via a national 237 
referendum. 
Not surprisingly, Professor Amar's novel work has drawn pointed 
criticism. Professor Henry Paul Monaghan of Columbia Law School 
rejects Amar's central claim as "historically groundless," arguing that 
Amar ignores both "the crucial role reserved for the states in the 
newly established constitutional order" and "the democracy-
restraining nature of the Constitution.,,238 In an exhaustively 
researched philosophical analysis of Amar's argument, Professor 
David R. Dow rejects it, adhering instead to the common-sense 
proposition that "the only way to amend the Constitution is in 
accordance with the mechanism outlined in article V.,,239 He reaches 
this conclusion, though, only after conceding that such a reading of 
the Constitution cannot be logically reconciled with the founding 
generation's commitment to popular sovereignty.24o His rejection of 
Professor Amar's claim ultimately rests on the radical, and 
simultaneously unhelpful, assertions that our Constitution embodies a 
paradox that "is not scientifically or logically resolvable," and that 
citizens, J'udges, and scholars need to learn "to live with the 
. ,,2 I 
tenSIOn. 
Professor Amar's Yale Law School colleague, Bruce Ackerman, 
has also argued that Article V cannot be the sole legitimate way to 
change the U.S. Constitution. In numerous law review articles242 and 
the two published volumes of his projected three-volume We the 
237. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 4, at 499-500. 
238. Monaghan, supra note 5, at 121 & 130; see also King, supra note 5, at 615-16 
(arguing that the historical record fails to support Amar's claims about the founding 
generation's understanding of the relationship between popular sovereignty and the 
Constitution's numerous super-majority requirements); Charles Fried, Foreword: 
Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13,29-33 (1995) (rejecting claims of Amar regarding 
non-exclusivity of Article V). 
239. David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article 
V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1,4 (1990). 
240. See id. at 8-10. 
241. [d. at 10-11; see also David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 117-44 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); John R. Vile, Legally Amending the 
United States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article V's Mechanisms, 21 CUMBo L. REV. 
271 (1991) (discussing Amar's claim regarding the non-exclusivity of Article V). 
242. See, e.g. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE 
L.J. 453 (1989); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 
93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1164 (1988); Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 475 (1995). 
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People series,243 Professor Ackennan has described the U.S. 
constitutional order as a "dualist democracy.,,244 By this he means that 
the American political order functions on two distinct tracks: (1) 
ordinary politics, and (2) constitutional politics. Government officials 
possess delegated authority to resolve issues in the fonner category, 
but only "We the People" have the power to engage in the "higher 
lawmaking" necessary for the latter category of decision. 245 Thus, a 
dualist democracy requires "leaders to return to the People and 
mobilize their considered support before foundational principles may 
be revised in a democratic way.,,246 According to Professor 
Ackennan, Article V constitutes one avenue for this sort of 
constitutional politics,247 but not the only one sanctioned by the 
Constitution. Like Professor Amar, he concludes that an interpretation 
of the Constitution that reads Article V as the exclusive, legally 
sanctioned means for amendment-an interpretation that he concedes 
would follow from the well-established interpretative canon expressio 
uniui
48
-"is inconsistent with both the Founding practice and its 
theory of popular sovereignty. ,,249 
More specifically, Professor Ackennan observes that the 
Federalists achieved the ratification of the U.S. Constitution only by 
violating the pre-existing rules for amending the Articles of 
Confederation and many of the state constitutions.25o The founders' 
disregard of these limitations in turn supplied "precedent" for 
subsequent refonn movements, i. e., radical Reconstruction and 
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, to disregard the rules of Article V 
and "amend" the Constitution in other ways not enumerated 
therein.25I "[W]e should learn to look upon the Foundin~ as a great 
precedent in the ongoing practice of popular sovereignty." 52 Much of 
Professor Ackennan's recent scholarship is devoted to distilling from 
our history the irreducible core of events that he identifies as essential 
243. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4; ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, 
supra note 4. 
244. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 6. 
245. See id. at 6-7. 
246. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 4, at 6. 
247. See id. at 23 ("Article Five provides an enduring resource for the American people 
when they wish to exercise their constituent power through the states."). 
248. See id. at 75-77. 
249. Id. at 16. 
250. See id. at 34-39; see also Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 242, at 478-514; supra 
notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
251. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 4, at 279. 
252. Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 242, at 572. 
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for legitimate non-Article V constitutional amendment.
253 
He also 
tentatively proposes a constitutional amendment, which might in time 
be added to the Constitution via the process described in Article V. 
That amendment would in tum codify the non-Article V procedures 
for amendment that emerge from our over two-hundred-year history 
by empowering a second-term President to propose constitutional 
amendments that could be ratified via two successive national 254 
referenda. 
Professor Ackerman's claims that the radical-Reconstruction 
Republicans and New Deal Democrats legitimately changed the 
Constitution by means not sanctioned by Article V have prompted an 
outpouring of scholarship from law professors, historians, and 
political scientists.255 As Professor Powe of the University of Texas 
succinctly observed, "[t]o say that Ackerman's thesis has been 
controversial is much like stating a Texas summer is warm.,,256 While 257 
some commentators have endorsed Ackerman's theory, others have 
identified shortcomings in Ackerman's legal or historical analysis.
258 
253. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 4, at 10-15; Ackerman & 
Katyal, supra note 242, at 569-73. 
254. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 52-55; ACKERMAN, 
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 4, at 410-12. 
255. See, e.g., KYVIG, supra note 5, at xi; VILE, supra note 9; Denning, supra note 5, at 
186-88; Dow, supra note 239, at 35-38; James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American 
People, II CONST. COMMENT. 355 (1994); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Change 
and the Politics of History, 108 YALE L.J. 1917 (1999); Harrison, supra note 5, at 377; 
Candice Hoke, Arendt, Tushnet, and Lopez: The Philosophical Challenge Behind 
Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 903 (1997); 
Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 107 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 
II CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994); David A. Pepper, Against Legalism: Rebutting An 
Anachronistic Account of 1937, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 63, 147-50 (1998); Elizabeth C. Price, 
Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 139 (1998); James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American 
People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1998) (hereinafter Fleming, We the Unconventional 
American People) (reviewing ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS); Suzanna Sherry, The 
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992) (reviewing ACKERMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS); Maria Seferian, Book Note, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (1999) 
(reviewing ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS). 
256. L.A. Powe, Jr., Ackermania or Uncomfortable Truths, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 547 
(1998) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998». 
257. See, e.g., Hoke, supra note 255, at 903 ("Ackerman is making startlingly original 
and valuable contributions [to] both" political philosophy and political theory.); Powe, 
supra note 256, at 570 (concluding that "Ackerman is right; the Constitution was 
fundamentally changed during Reconstruction and the New Deal" and "Article V cannot 
describe with acceptable accuracy what occurred"). 
258. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 
2115,2143-47 (1999). Some critics have treated Ackerman's more controversial claims 
with irony, if not sarcasm. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, I'm Even Smarter Than 
Bruce Ackerman: Why The President Can Veto His Own Impeachment, 16 CONST. 
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The various objections include assertions that Ackerman, like Amar, 
accords too little significance to both federalism259 and the protection 
of individual rights against majority tyranny.260 Other critics have 
argued that Ackerman's historical analysis is partial, if not also 
selective.261 Finally, some commentators have identified weaknesses 
in Ackerman's presentation to date but have nevertheless reserved 
final judgment pending the gublication of the projected third volume 
in his We the People series.2 2 
B. Applying the Lessons Learned from the Corwin Amendment 
Many people, when they first learn of the Corwin Amendment, 
voice an intuition that its effort to shelter slavery from future 
constitutional amendment is somehow flawed-that if the Corwin 
Amendment had been ratified it could have nevertheless been 
repealed by a subsequent amendment that at the same time abolished 
slavery. Part IV set forth the reasoning that leads to that conclusion 
without, as the senatorial opponents of the Corwin Amendment 
proposed to do, dispensing with the two explicit substantive limits 
that the founders placed on the Article V amending power. This 
article's analysis of the constitutional question posed by the Corwin 
Amendment uncovered two fundamental principles of our 
constitutional order. First, the founders of the Constitution exercised 
COMMENT. I, 5 (1999) (identifying as "the central theme of Ackerman's brilliant 
academic career" the proposition "that the Constitution embodies, in no particular 
provision but everywhere in general, a preference for the results of popular democratic 
liberalism over backward-looking countermajoritarian procedures and checks that, 
inexplicably and unfortunately, managed to make their way into the actual text of the 
Constitution as written") (citing ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS and ACKERMAN, 
TRANSFORMATIONS). 
259. See, e.g., Price, supra note 255, at 195-202. 
260. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About Deliberation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
1187, 1190-91 (1992) (reviewing ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS) (criticizing as "question-
begging in the extreme" Ackerman's rejection of a "rights foundationalism" theory of 
constitutional rights). Cj, Paulsen, supra note 258, at 5 (emphasizing Ackerman's neglect 
of the countermajoritarian nature of the Constitution). 
261. See, e.g., Eric Foner, The Strange Career of the Reconstruction Amendments, 108 
YALE LJ. 2003 (1999); Colin Gordon, Rethinking the New Deal: We the People: 
Transformations, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (1998) (same); William E. Leuchtenburg, 
When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman 
Thesis, 108 YALE LJ. 2077 (1999); McConnell, supra note 255; Jack N. Rakove, The 
Super-Legality of the Constitution, or, a Federalist Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Neo-
Federalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1931, 1940-46 (1999). But see Powe, supra note 256, at 548 
("Ackerman's sophisticated discussion of Reconstruction and the New Deal puts to rest 
any claim that his thesis rests on thin or sloppy history."). 
262. See, e.g., Michael 1. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common Law of 
Higher Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731, 1793-94 (1999) (reviewing BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998». 
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the extralegal, revolutionary, natural right to make and alter existing 
forms of government, supplanting the Articles of Confederation with 
the Constitution. Second, the founders were able to invoke this 
extraordinary authority at least in part because they both made clear 
to their constituents that they sought to exercise that authority and 
forthrightly acknowledged their disregard of the requirements for 
amendment under the pre-existing constitutional regime-namely, the 
Articles of Confederation. 
These two principles point towards a previously unarticulated 
resolution of the on-going academic controversy concerning the 
exclusivity of Article V vel non. Scholars who have addressed this 
subject have, to date, struggled to reconcile Article V's anti-
majoritarian constraints with the founders' evident commitment to 
popular sovereignty. Both Amar and Ackerman have invoked the 
founders' reliance on the People as the ultimate source of lawful 
authority 263 to support their startling conclusions that Article V cannot 
constitute the sole means for legal constitutional amendment.264 They 
have correctly concluded that the framing and ratification of the 
Constitution provide precedent for subsequent generations to change 
the Constitution without complying with the commands of Article 
V.265 Yet in so concluding they have collapsed the distinction (which 
was apparent to the founders) between lawful amendment sanctioned 
by the positive-law of the existing constitutional order and the extra-
legal, revolutionary, natural right to abolish the existing order and 
replace it with a new regime. Having neglected this fundamental 
difference, Professors Amar and Ackerman have accordingly failed to 
ask two crucially important subsidiary questions, namely: (1) how did 
the founders manage to invoke this revolutionary authority, which 
allowed them to act in disregard of the Articles of Confederation rules 
for amendment, and (2) what would subsequent generations be 
required to do in order to invoke the same revolutionary authority and 
act in disregard of Article V's limitations on the amending power? 
Again, the preceding analysis of the Corwin Amendment suggests 
answers to both these questions. As Part I of this article demonstrated, 
when the proposed Constitution went to the people for ratification, its 
proponents openly conceded that the actions and product of the 
263. But see supra note 19, acknowledging dispute between Professors Amar and 
Ackerman as to the "legality" of the Constitution of 1787. 
264. See supra notes 237 & 249 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra Part I. 
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Philadelphia Convention could not be reconciled with the Articles of 
Confederation.266 Instead, the Federalists forthrightly appealed to the 
natural ri~ht of revolution and sought redemption from this higher 
authority. '67 Whether these express confessions of illegality and 
invocations of revolutionary authority were alone sufficient to call 
forth the natural right of the people to change their form of 
government, their repeated utterance shows that the friends of the 
proposed constitution deemed such confessions and invocations as a 
necessary first step to laying claim to this authority. Likewise, those 
who seek to follow in the founders' footsteps in this regard must, at a 
bare minimum, disclaim the authority of the existing constitutional 
regime and forthrightly call upon the awesome and terrible power of 
I . 268 revo utIon. 
The thorough development and application of these two principles 
to the rich and wide-ranging debate over the theses of Professors 
Amar and Ackerman is beyond the scope of this article on the Corwin 
Amendment. For present purposes, it suffices to observe that 
Professors Amar and Ackerman ignore these principles. As they both 
claim, incorrectly, to have established the legality under the U.S. 
Constitution of past or hypothetical future constitutional changes 
made in defiance of Article V, they omit any discussion of the 
possibility that these same past or hypothetical future changes might 
be illegal under the Constitution but nevertheless legitimate exercises 
of an ever-present natural right of revolution. 
So too, the numerous critics of Amar and Ackerman have to date 
neglected these issues. Many have instead resisted the "Yale 
School's" conclusions by denying, implicitly or explicitly and for a 
variety of reasons, that the founders' commitment to an inalienable 
right of revolution survived the ratification of the Constitution.269 
266. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
267. Id; see also Kay, supra note 19, at 66-67. 
268. The proponents of the Corwin Amendment did no such thing, and this failure 
would have precluded them from adding a third substantive limitation to the two the 
founders had grafted onto Article V's amendment procedure if the Amendment had been 
ratified. 
269. See, e.g. Dow, supra note 239, at 8-12; Monaghan, supra note 5, at 121 & 130; 
Price, supra note 255, at 195-202. Other critics more sympathetic to an interpretativist 
approach to judicial elaboration of the Constitution's meaning have dismissed the claims 
of Amar or Ackerman or both as not very significant. These critics assert that the meaning 
of the Constitution has changed and will continue to change without an Article V 
amendment quite frequently, whenever a majority of the sitting Justices says so. See, e.g., 
Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, supra note 255, at 1539 (asserting that 
"[t]he best way to avoid the tendency to propagate myths of rediscovery is to eschew 
original ism, both narrow and broad, in favor of a theory of interpretation that conceives 
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Other commentators have questioned particular historical claims by 
one or more authors.27o But to date, none of the critics of Amar or 
Ackerman have carefully examined the possibility that a sole but 
nevertheless legitimate and viable alternative to Article V amendment 
might be to exercise the inalienable right of revolution, which (as 
Amar and Ackerman have so forcefully demonstrated) allowed the 
founders to defy the Articles of Confederation limits on constitutional 
amendment. Accordingly, none of the many opponents to the Amar 
and Ackerman theses have explored in any detail how such 
revolutionary authority might be properly invoked. Nor have these 
existing critics inquired whether this authority has ever been 
legitimately employed to make non-Article V changes to our 
Constitution after its ratification. As these inquiries lie outside the 
scope of an article on the Corwin Amendment, they must wait for 
another time and place for further examination. This detour, however, 
demonstrates the present theoretical importance of that 1861 proposal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Faced with a sectional crisis and the threat of civil war, the Second 
Session of the Thirty-sixth Congress considered a number of 
extraordinary compromise measures. It eventually proposed the 
Corwin Resolution to the States. That proposed Amendment was 
never ratified, so its efficacy was never tested. Had it been ratified, 
however, it would have had only persuasive force. It would not have 
been legally binding because its framers, unlike those of the 1787 
Convention, lacked the power to set the rules for future amendment 
under the Constitution. To remove an issue from the confines of 
Article V required more than a routine amendment; it required 
revolutionary authority. 
The Corwin Resolution was historically significant because it 
demonstrated that the South wanted inviolable guarantees from the 
North and that strong political support for federal interference with 
slavery in the States had not yet developed. Mr. Corwin's proposed 
constitutional amendment was, and remains, constitutionally 
significant because it was an unprecedented attempt to use Article V 
to prevent future amendments under Article V. Analysis of that effort 
fidelity to the Constitution as integrity with the moral reading of the Constitution," 
providing flexibility for changes in interpretation without stretching the concepts of 
original meaning or popular sovereignty). 
270. See, e.g., King, supra note 5, at 615-16; supra note 261 (citing commentary critical 
of Ackerman's history). 
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leads not only to an understanding as to why it would have failed 
legally, but also to the discovery of a fundamental distinction between 
routine amendment and legitimate constitutional revolution. That 
distinction in turn promises to clarify an important contemporary 
debate about whether Article V describes the sole legal means for 
constitutional evolution. 
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